The basis in legal theory for the relationship of banker and seller under the banker's commercial credit by Vanthavong, Saysangouane
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
THE BASIS IN LEGAL THEORY FOR THE
RELATIONSHIP OF BANKER AND SELLER 
UNDER THE BANKERCOMMERCIAL CREDIT
A dissertation submitted in partial 
fulfilment of the requirement of the 
degree of Master of Laws at the 
University of Glasgow
by
Saysangouiane Vanthavong
ProQuest Number: 10646919
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uesL
ProQuest 10646919
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Copy 3.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
Abbreviations
Summary
Introductory and General 
I THEORIES INVOLVING CONSIDERATION OP
ALL THREE PARTIES 27 - §6
(1) The Guarantee Theory 27 36
(2) Tlie Delegation Theory 3-7 “ 42
(3) The Personal Bar or Estoppel Theory 43 49
(4) The Assignment Theory 30 - 59
(5) The Novation Theory 59
(6) The Agency Theory 60 ^ 65
a # The buyer as the agent of the seller 60 •» 63
b # The banlcer as the agent of the buyer 63 " 65
(7) The Jus Quaesitum Tertio Tlieory 66 80
a* In English law 66 *«» 71
b# In Scottish law 72 - 80
11 MERCANTILE USAGE THEORY 81 « 90
The Mercantile Speciality Theory 81 •» 90
III ORDINARY CONTIUOTUAL THEORIES 91 - 117
(1) The Seller’s Offer Theory 91 « 97
(2) Mead’s Theory 98 102
(3) The Offer and Acceptance Theory 103 - 108
(4) The Offer-held-opon and Unilateral 109 - 117
Voluntary Obligation Theories
CONCLUSION 118 « 121
Appendix s Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits (l9?4 Revision) 122 - l46
PREFACE
This dissertation has been done with reference 
to books and material available in the library of 
the University of Glasgow. Those concerning the 
banker’s commercial credits are mostly of foreign 
sources since this type of mercantile instrument 
has been little discussed in the light of Scots 
law and apparently there seems as yet to be no 
case decided in the Scottish courts. Much re­
course must therefore be made to citation of 
foreign authorities. Such authorities have no 
force in Scotland but c^n show how foreign courts 
have dealt with problems arising under the banker’s 
credit and are of assistance to the discussion in 
this dissertation. Tli© U.C.P. have now been 
adopted internationally by trading nations and 
by British banks since I963 though some points 
are not supported by legal authorities. However 
the judges in dealing with the problems involved 
in this discussion seemed to approach the question 
with the practical use of the credit in mind more 
than its conformity with the existing legal 
authorities.
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SUMMARY
Tiie banker’s commercial credit, an important 
device for payment, has become much in use nowadays 
in world trade to finance foreign business# Prom a 
businessman’s point of view the credit looks simple 
but the study of the legal relationship engendered 
by this mercantile instrument has caused much diffi­
culty among lawyers, The present dissertation is 
concerned to set out attempts to fit the banlcer- 
seller relationship arising under the irrevocable 
credit into a theory and to examine and criticise 
these in the light of their national law and Scottish 
law*
The first chapter takes consideration of the 
theories which see the credit in terms of contracts 
involving all three parties # This brings us to 
examine seven main theories :
1# The Guarantee Theory : Xt is suggested that the 
banker’s promise to the seller merely amounts to a 
guarantee by him of payment by the buyer# The main 
objection is that in the credit the banker has a 
primary obligation and not secondary or accessory 
to other obligation as in a guarantee *
2 * The Delegation Theory s The buyer (del©gant) 
requests the banlt (délégué ), his debtor under the 
contract for the arrangement of the credit, to pay 
the debt to the seller (délégataire)* This theory 
cannot/
—  X 3.
cannot answer all the requirements of the credit in 
view of the fact that the seller’s acceptance is 
needed to male© the banlier bound by his undertaking*
3* The Personal Bar or Estoppel Theory : The irrevoc­
able credit represents that the banker has in his hand 
from the buyer sufficient funds to pay the seller’s 
drafts and, consequently, he is barred from denying 
this* This view is not in line with the practice of 
tho credit and was rejected in Morgan v* Lariviere 
(1875) L*R, 7 h *l . 423*
4* The Assignment Theory t The irrevocable credit is 
regarded as constituting a contract between the banlcer 
and the buyer which is assigned simultaneously by the 
latter to the seller* Xn considering this it is hard 
to bring the facts into line with the theory and more­
over the theory will render the seller subject to any 
defences the bank has against the buyer*
5* The Novation Theory : There is a novation of the 
sale contract, i*e# the buyer drops out of the contract 
and it becomes binding between the banker and the seller* 
This argument would lead to the loss of the buyer’s 
right to reject the goods which are not conform to the 
contract of sale and also the banker would be involved 
with the dealings with the goods*
6* The Aæenov Theory s (a) The buyer is acting as the 
seller’s agent in arranging for the credit according 
to the terms laid dotra in the contract of sale*
According to this theory the seller would be liable 
for/
lii *•
for the fraudulent acts of his agent, the buyer, in 
performing his duty within his authority*
(b) Hie banlcer, acting according 
to the buyer’s instructions, may be deemed to act as 
the buyer’s agent# The objection to this argument is 
that the banker undertakes a primary obligation towards 
the seller and is not acting as the buyer’s agent#
7* The Jus Quaesitum Tertio Theory s Xt is suggested 
that there is a contract between the buyer and the 
banker conferring the benefit of it to the seller, a 
third party# This theory cannot stand in the light 
of English law which does not recognise a right 
arising from jus quaesitum tertio contract, Jus 
quaesitum tertio is a well-established principle in 
the law of Scotland and presents some similarities 
with the credit but it cannot datisfy the require­
ments of the credit regarding its origin and legal 
consequences•
The second chapter concerns the Mercantile 
Speciality theory* Xt is favoured by many authors 
of common law countries since it is the only solution 
to help them to overcome the problem of consideration 
encountered in the credit *
The third chapter considers the ordinary 
contractual theories # Unlike the first chapter it 
takes consideration of the relationship between the 
banker and the seller only# This brings us to 
egamlne four theories *
I* Til© Seller’s Offer Theory : The seller enters into 
a contract with the banker offering to surrender the 
documents to the banker instead of to the buyer in 
return for the banker’s undertaking to honour his 
drafts* This theory would bring the buyer into the 
scene to communicate the seller’s offer to the banker 
and also it may not comply with practice in that the 
seller’s offer is required to bind the banlcer.
2. Mead’s Theory s Xt is suggested that the contract 
entered into between the banlc and the seller under 
an irrevocable credit is one in which the banker is 
an offerer and the seller offeree with consideration 
given by the buyer to the banker on behalf of the 
seller* The objection to this theory is that the 
seller’s acceptance is required to make the banker 
bound, moreover the validity of the credit would 
depend on an adequate consideration from the buyer*
If the latter fails to provide a good consideration, 
the banlcer-soller relationship would not stand «
3,. The Offer and Acoeptanoe T^ ; The relationship
between banker and seller is seen to be of the form 
of an ordinary contract* The credit is an offer 
which the seller may accept * Objections arise 
concerning the ascertainment of the act of acceptance 
by the seller and the elimination of time-lag during 
which the banlcer would be justified in revoking an 
irrevocable credit*
4*/
4# Th.© Offer-held-open and Unilateral Voluntary 
Obligation Theories s According to the offer-held-open 
theory the banker makes an offer to the seller and 
undertakes to keep it open for a period of time. In 
the unilateral voluntary obligation theory the banlcer 
promises to pay the seller’s draft provided that the 
latter acts in accordance with the letter of credit.
The discussion of these reveals that in Scots law they 
are able to answer all the requirements of the relation­
ship of banlcer and seller under the banker’s commercial 
credit.
Among the attempts discussed in this dissertation 
the offer-h©ld*-op©n and the unilateral voluntary 
obligation theories seem to be the only ones which 
can provide an adequate solution. These arguments 
have still far to go to become accepted as a general 
theory* It would meet severe objections especially 
in the common law countries due to their attitude 
towards the doctrine of consideration and privity of 
contract.
4. •
INTRODUCTORY AND GENERAL
1, Introduction
International commercial transactions have 
existed in the past and will develop in the future 
according to usage and practice of commerce and 
different factors conditioning them* These trans­
actions have led to the appearance of various modes 
of financing trade and as the latter has developed 
the old modes of financing tend to be inappropriate 
to the trade of modern times and that is why this 
has progressively led to the appearance of a new 
device of payment.
The banker’s commercial credit^ is a device for 
payment which is very commonly used nowadays for 
foreign trade transactions and for domestic negoti­
ation within certain countries, for example the 
United States of America, but as yet not in Britain*
A clear distinction should be made between
lettex's of credit and modern commercial credits, both
2
of which are frequently used in banlcing practice .
The former has been long known in business* It was 
used as long ago as the twelfth century by Popes, 
princes, and other rulers who wished to procure 
advances/
1* or documentary credit
2* The older form of letter of credit is handed to 
the customer (the buyer), who, in his turn, 
produces it or hands it to the seller. The modern 
letter of credit is sent directly by the issuing 
or intermediary banker to the seller*
2 .
advances for their servants* The latter is of recent 
growth and gained tremendously in importance between 
the txfo wars when world trade began to increase 
enormously#
Concerning the original form of credit Bell 
stated? "A letter of credit is a mandate authorising 
the person addressed to pay money, or furnish goods, 
to another, on the credit of the writer*"' Commenting 
on this point Gloag pointed out? "A letter of credit 
is not merely a contract between the bank and the 
party to whom it is issued, but an offer by the banlc 
to anyone who may talc© a cheque or a bill under it, 
and therefore the banlc cannot refuse acceptance of a 
bill draTO under the letter of credit, on the plea 
that the party to whom the letter was issued is other­
wise indebted to them,
As for the banker’s commercial credit, the General 
Provisions and Definitions of the Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits (l9?4 Revision) 
stipulate as follows?
(a) These provisions and definitions and the following 
articles apply to all documentary credits and are 
binding upon all parties thereto unless otherwise 
expressly agreed#
(b) For the purposes of such provisions, definitions 
and articles the expressions ’documentary credit(s)* 
and/
3. Bell Prime* 279 Com* I 388-9. S<2e AASr
4# Gloag p. 23
3.
and ’credit(s)* used therein mean any arrangement, 
however named or described, whereby a bank (the 
issuing bank), acting at the request and in accordance 
with the instructions of a customer (the applicant 
for the credit):
(i) is to make payment to or to the order of a third 
party (the beneficiary), or is to pay, accept or 
negotiate bills of exchange (drafts) dravni by 
the beneficiary, or 
(ii) authorises such payments to be made or such 
drafts to be paid, accepted or negotiated by 
another bank,
against stipulated documents, provided that the terras 
and conditions of the credit are complied with,
(o) Credits, by their nature, are separate trans­
actions from the sales or other contracts on which 
they may be baaed and banlts are in no way concerned 
with or bound by such contracts*
(d) Credit instructions and the credits themselves 
must be complete and precise. In order to guard 
against confusion and misunderstanding, issdihG 
banlcs should discourage any attempt by the applicant 
for the credit to include excessive detail,
(e) The bank first entitled to exercise the option 
available under Article No* 32(b) shall be the bank 
authorised to pay, accept or negotiate under a credit * 
The decision of such banlc shall bin^ all parties 
concerned,
A/
#A basils; is authorised to pay or accept under a 
credit by being specifically nominated in the credit,
A bank is authorised to negotiate under a credit 
eithert
(i) by being specifically nominated in the credit, or
(ii) by the credit being freely negotiable by any bank,
(f) A beneficiary can in no case avail himself of the 
contractual relationships existing between banlcs or 
between the applicant for the credit and the issuing 
bank^.
The nature of the older form of letter of credit 
involves three parties: a person (usually a merchant
or a banlcer) guarantees payment to another person for 
advancing money or furnishing goods to a third person 
on the strength of the credit# The commercial letter 
of credit, however, in spite of their similarity in 
their transaction, are provided to be a separate 
transaction involving banlcer and seller only^#
With the us© of the banker’s commercial credits, 
the banker play© a very important role in facilitating 
the transactions and overcoming difficulties such as 
lack of knowledge, confidence in the solvency of the 
buyer/
5, The last revision of the U#G#P* was mad© in 3-974 
with collaboration between the International Chamber 
of Commerce, the United Nations and the foreign 
trade banks of the socialist countries, This 
definition is internationally accepted# The U,G#P# 
are not law but a body of rules of behaviour binding 
on banlc© and applicants alike who have accepted them#
6. See Rodger 31-32 -
buyer or tlie political instability of the country
of the buyer and solving the conflicting economic
interests of the parties to the contract of sale*
"The interest of the exporter is to obtain the
purchase price as soon as possible, but not to part
with the documents of title to the goods, notably
the bill of lading, before having received payment
or, at least, being certain that his draft has
been accepted, while the buyer wishes to postpone
payment of the price until he has had an opportunity
8of reselling the goods*"
The credit looks simple to a businessman* It 
is a device for financing transactions on which the 
seller can rely. The banker, by issuing or confirming 
the credit, has an obligation to negotiate the seller’s 
drafts provided that the terms of the credit are 
complied with. However, it is a difficult task for 
the lawyer who endeavours to determine the different 
rights and obligations arising under it and fit it 
in a legal theory^,
Before discussing the different theories advanced 
to determine the foanker-seller relationship, it is 
necessary to consider the different elements which 
will help in the analysis of the various problems 
involved/
7• Bill of exchange 
8, See Schmitthoff p, 205 
9* See Mead pp. 300-301
involved in this particular subject. This will 
include a brief survey of firstly the object and the 
operation of the credit, secondly the different types 
of credit, and thirdly the businessman’s point of 
view and the lawyer’s attitude concerning the 
relationships arising from the operation of the 
credit,
The Purpose and th© Nature of the Banker’a Commercial 
Credit
The operation of the banlcer*s commercial credit 
was explained by Scrutton, L, J# in Guaranty Trust Co* 
y . Hanny & C o in the early period of the use of the 
modern credit as follows;
"The enormous volume of sales of produce by a 
vendor in one country to a purchaser in another has 
led to the creation of an equally great financial 
system intervening* between vendor and purchaser, and 
designed to enable commercial transactions to be carried 
out with the greatest money convenience to both parties. 
The vendor, to help the finance of his business, desires 
to get his purchase price as soon as possible after he 
has despatched the goods to his purchaser5 with this 
object he draws a bill of exchange for the price, 
attaches to the draft the documents of carriage and 
insurance of the goods sold and sometimes an invoice 
for the price, and discounts the bill, that is, sells 
the bill, with the documents attached, to an exchange 
house. The vendor thus gets his money before the 
purchaser would, in ordinary course, pay| the exchange 
house duly presents the bill for acceptance, and has, 
until the bill is accepted, the security of a pledge 
of the documents attached and the goods they represent. 
The buyer, on the other hand, may not desire to pay the 
price until he has resold the goods, If the draft is 
drawn/
10, (1918) 2 K,B. 623 at p, 659
drawn on him, thé vendor or exchange house may not 
wish to part with the documents of title till the 
acceptance given by the purchaser is met at maturity* 
But if the purchaser can arrange that a banlc of high 
standing shall accept the draft, the exchange house 
may be willing to part with the documents on receiving 
the acceptance of the banlc* The exchange house will 
then have the promise of the banlc to pay, which, if 
in the form of a bill of exchange, is negotiable and 
can be discounted at once* The bank will have the 
documents of title as security for its liability on 
the acceptance, and the purchaser can make arrange­
ments to sell and deliver the goods* Before accept­
ance the documents of title are the security, and an 
unaccepted bill without documents attached is not 
readily negotiable* After acceptance the credit of 
the bank is the security."
Later, the same learned judge, discussing the
course of business in Equitable Trust Co* of New York
11V# Dawson Partners Ltd* said :
"The system is intended to allow the seller to 
obtain money as soon as he ships the goods by dis­
counting biJ-ls dratim on the purchaser, while the 
purchaser has not to pay for the goods until some 
time after he has sold them. To do this the 
discounting/
11. [1925] 25 Ll.L.Rep, 90 at p.93* See also
Guaranty Trust Go* of New York v, Van Per Berghs 
JÎF26*r"2TlLTrLr“R ^  452 per
Scrutton, L.J.
discounting banîc must be furnished with some security 
satisfactory to it that if the shipment complies with 
certain conditions it will be paid for. This is 
obtained by the promise of the banlc giving the ... 
credit to accept bills for the price if the shipment 
complies with the specified conditions* These con­
ditions generally involve attaching to the bill certain 
documents# such as a bill of lading for the contract 
goods# a policy of insurance on these goods# and some­
times some form of certificate that goods shipped comply 
with the contract description,"
Also Gutteridge and Megrah# setting out the object 
and the nature of commercial credits# said;
"The object# from a business point of view# of 
the so-called banker’s commercial credit is usually 
to facilitate dealings between merchants domiciled in 
different countries# by ensuring payment to the seller 
on the one hand and delivery to the buyer of the contract 
goods on the other * #,
Broadly speaking the method which is often adopted 
to finance overseas trade is to insert in the contract 
for the sale of the goods a provision that payment of 
the price shall be made by a banlcer# and preferably a 
banker carrying on business in the country of export*
The banlcer# in other words, acting on behalf of the 
buyer and either directly with the seller or through 
the intervention of a banlcer in the seller * s country, 
assumes liability for payment of the price, in 
consideration/
consideration, perhaps, of the security afforded to
him by a pledge of the documents of title to the good©
or of his being placed in funds in advance or of an
undertaking to reimburse# and of a commission,"
¥hi3.e explaining the x’ea.lisation of the credit
nowadays they continued?
"Today the normal, though by no means the exclusive,
operation, as will foe seen, takes the form of payment
as negotiation, possibly acceptance, by a correspondent
banlcer in the country from which the goods emanate,
acting on behalf of the banker issuing the credit or
perhaps for himself* Or the credit may call for drafts
on the issuing banlc or on the buyer and be available
for negotiation by either a specified, or any, bank*
Except where the same bank is operating both in the
country of export and tho importing country, almost
invariably two banlcs at least are concerned in contracts
12of documentary credit *"
The credit bears different names in different 
circumstances* It is important to talce into consider­
ation the classifications of these various types which 
have legal and banlcing primordial importance*
12* Gutteridge and Megrah pp# 1-2, 
See also Rodger pp* 31-32
11.
Types of Credits
A'iTI ^  «f« WR» tmi NM» «H» «m*-4 ^
In bus3„ness, credits are usually named or labelled 
in various ways depending on their use and function# 
Underlining those different types of credit and showing 
their legal effect Miller sayss "Bankers’ commercial 
credits are in practice distinguished by descriptive 
names e.g. revocable;^ irrevocable, documentary, trans­
ferable, revolving and so on# The application of a 
descriptive labbl of this kind is not of itself of 
paramount legal significance since the court will arrive 
at the legal effect of any credit from a consideration 
of the terms, including implied terms, of the letter 
of credit as a whole and will not assign it automatically 
to a legal, category suggested by the bankers' descriptive 
label for it,"^^
111 spite of these various ways of naming them, 
however, credits are classified according to banlcing 
practice into two main categories# They are either 
revocable or irrevocable. They are so called at their 
issue by the issuing bank but they can be called uncon­
firmed or confirmed at a later stage depending on the 
intermediary banlcer ' s undertaking. This reflects the 
character of the banker’s undertaking which is of 
fundamental importance in the banlcing and legal point 
of view. Apart from these types of credit it seems 
that the court does not see any importance in other 
labels/
13# See Miller p. 3
JL tfC
label,s given to the credit as Davis says : "Non© of
tile se forms of credit lias apparently been tlie subject
3 4'of judicial consideration in this country*""
The classification of the credits is stipulated 
in ar tic3.e 1 of the U * G * P * ^ ^
Article I
a) Credits may be either
(i) revocable# or
(ii) irrevocable*
b) All credits# therefore# should clear3.y indicate 
whether they are revocable or irrevocable*
c) In the absence of such Indication the credit shall 
be deemed to be revocable.
Following the classification of the credits# 
article IX of the U*C,P* describes a revocable credit 
in these terms?
"A revocable credit may be amended or cancelled 
at any moment without prior notice to the beneficiary. 
However# the issuing bank is bound to reimburse a branch 
or other banlc to which such a credit has been trans­
mitted and made avai3.ab3,e for payment# acceptance or 
negotiation, for any payment# acceptance or negotiation 
complying with the terms and conditions of the credit 
and any amendments received up to the time of payment, 
acceptance or negotiation made by such branch or other 
bank/
l4. Davis p. 32. See also Gutteridge and Megrah p. 13. 
15* A form and notification of credits
#banlc prior to receipt by it of notice of amendment or 
of cancellation*"
The main idea behind articles I and II of the U.C.P* 
concerning a revocable credit is that a credit is revoc­
able if it is written on the face of it, when there is 
no indication as to whether it is revocable or irrevoc­
able or when it can be revoked or cancelled at any time 
without notice to the beneficiary* However, the issuing 
banlcer is bound by his obligation if the credit is 
realised before the cancellation* Explaining a case of 
a revohable credit Miller says: "The most frequent 
instance in commercial practice of the revocable credit 
arises when the purchaser’s bank instructs a corres­
pondent in another country to open a credit in favour 
of the seller and to advise the seller of the terms of 
the credit without confirming it *•* In such cases the 
correspondent, the advising bank, make© it clear to 
the seller that it is merely advising the credit and 
does not accept liability thereunder, usually adding 
the words "the credit is subject to cancellation at 
any time without notice"^'^*
This is illustrated by the decision of a wellknown
17case Cap© Asbestos Co* v# Lloyds Bank where the Banque 
de l’Eôt, Warsaw, issued a credit to the beneficiary 
through Lloyds Bank* The latter advised the beneficiary 
of the credit in these terms :
"We/
16. Be© Miller p, 4
1 7 .  [ 1 9 2 1 ]  W * M *  2 7 4
”Wo beg to inform you that we have received advice 
by telegraph from the Banque de l»Eét, Warsaw, of the 
issue of a credit in your favour for £1,620 on
account of Stubicki and Felsze, Warsaw, to expire 
and to be availed of meanwhile by your draft on us at 
sight accompanied by invoice* Bill of lading in complete 
set to order of Lloyds Banlc Ltd., covering shipment of 
30 tons asbestos sheets consigned to Stubicki and 
Felsze, Warsaw •«• This is merely an advice of the 
opening of the above-mentioned credit, and is not a 
confirmation of the same*"
On 4th August 1920, Lloyds Bank was informed of 
the cancollqtion of the credit but did not inform the 
plaântiffe : beneficiary of this fact* On 30th September 
1920 the plaintiffs shipped the goods under the credit 
and presented to Lloyds Bank for payment which was 
refused* The plaintiffs sued Lloyds Banlc on the ground 
that it was the banlcer * s duty to give notice of cancel­
lation of the credit and asked for damages* Lloyds 
Banlc admitted it was their practice to notify the 
beneficiary of the cancellation as a matter of grace, 
not of legal duty# It was held that "as the credit was 
revocable in form, there was no legal duty on the banîc 
to notify Gape Asbestos Co# Ltd* of its cancellation*"
A revocable credit, being subject to cancellation 
at any time without prior notice to the seller bene­
ficiary, is considered to be a very weak security for 
the/
JLD *
the latter to rely upon^^, Nonetheless it is better 
than having no credit whatsoever# So long as it 
remains uncanoelled, the beneficiary ean make use of 
it and the issuing bank becomes liable for his under­
taking under the terms of the credit.
Normally the intermediary bank does not confirm 
a revocable credit. Concerning this Gutteridge and 
Hegrah say; "A revocable credit is never confirmed, 
this would be a contradiction in t e r m s , S i m i l a r l y  
Rodger said: "It is possible to have an irrevocable 
credit which is not confirmed, but very unlikely to 
have a confirmed credit which is not irrevocable, as 
no advising banlc would be likely to undertake an
obligation which the issuing bank is apparently not
20willing to shoulder," The confirming bank will not 
be foolish enough to undertake the obligations directly 
to the beneficiary unless there is an error since he 
cannot withdraw his obligations towards the seller 
after the credit is cancelled by the issuing banlt.
An irrevocable credit, one of the two main types 
of the credit, is described in article 3 of the b,G,P, 
in the following terms:
a) An irrevocable credit constitutes a definite 
undertaking of the issuing bank provided that the 
terms/
Rodger p, 34 
19, Gutteridge and Megrah, p, 19
20* Rodger, p* 34
JLO
terms and conditions of the credit are complied with:
(i) to pay, or that payment will be made, if the 
credit provides for payment, whether against 
a draft or not;
(ii) to accept drafts if the credit provides for
acceptance by the issuing banlc or to be respon­
sible for their acceptance and payment at 
maturity if the credit provides for the accept­
ance of drafts drawn on the applicant for the 
credit or any other drawee specified in the 
credit;
(ill) to purchase/negotiate, without recourse to
drawers and/or bona fide holders, drafts drawn 
by the beneficiary, at sight or at a tenor, on 
the applicant for the credit or on any other 
drawee specified in the credit, or to provide 
for purchase/negotiation*
b) An irrevocable credit may be advised to a bene­
ficiary through another bantc (the advising banli:) 
without engagement on the part of that banlc, but when 
an issuing bank authorise© or request© another bank to 
confirm its Irrevocable credit and the latter doe© so, 
such confirmation constitutes a definite undertaleing 
of the confirming banlc in addition to the undertaking 
of the issuing banîc, provided that the terms and 
condition© of the credit are complied with?
(i) to pay, if the credit is payable at its ovm 
counters, whether against a draft or not, or 
that/
tliat payment will be made if the credit provides 
for payment elsewhere;
(ii) to accept drafts if the credit provides for
acceptance by the confirming bank, at its o \m  
counters, or to be responsible for their accept­
ance and payment at maturity if the credit provides 
for the acceptance of drafts draim, on the applicant 
for the credit or any other drawee specified in 
the credit;
(iii) to purchase/negotiate, without recourse to drawers 
and/or bona fide holders, drafts drawn by the 
beneficiary, at sight or at a tenor, on the 
issuing bank, or on the applicant for the credit 
or any other drawee specified in the credit, if 
the credit provides for purchase/negotiation#
c) Such undertakings can neither be amdnded nor can­
celled without the agreement of all parties thereto. 
Partial acceptance of amendments is not effective 
without the agreement of all parties thereto.
The above article gives a clear statment about 
the legal position and the purpose of an irrevocable 
credit. The banlcor binds himself by his outright 
undertaking in favour of the seller-beneficiary 
provided the terras stipulated in the credit are 
complied with.
The nature of the definite under talcing which 
emanates from the issuing banlc; can be confirmed by the 
intermediary/
intermediary bank* Thus the latter undertake© directly 
an absolute obligation towards the beneficiary. Rodger 
describes an irrevocable and confirmed credit in these 
terms? "Ifhere the issuing banîc gives an outright under­
taking to honour drafts drawn in terms of the credit, 
the credit is irrevocable as the part of the issuing 
bank, and where the advising banlc also gives its out­
right undertaking the credit ia * confirmed* by the
PIad vis ing banîc, " *
The irrevocable and confirmed credit is a very 
convenient and reliable security for the seller. It 
is of common use in the modern export trade. The seller 
beneficiary is sure that the confirming bank is the 
place of payment for him, and that he will receive the 
price of the goods under the credit when tendering the 
right documents and at the correct time. A confirmed 
credit is more expensive than an unconfirmed one because 
the buyer has tb pay an extra charge for the confirmation 
of it#
If the credit is irrevocable but unconfirmed, the 
definite undertaking by the issuing bank is advised to 
the beneficiary by the intermediary banlc only. The 
latter does not take any obligation in meeting the 
drafts presented by the seller-benefioiary. From the 
business point of view, the irrevocable and unconfirmed 
credit is a very unsatisfactory mode of payment for the 
beneficiary/
21. Rodger, p. 34. See also Schmitthoff, p. 228
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beneficiary since the place of payment is not sure to
him. If the advising banlc refuses to negotiate the
dirafts, problems will arise for him in taking steps for
the payment of drafts in the buyer's country* However
in the economic point of view this type of credit is
cheaper for the buyer since the charge of confirmation
is excluded#
As said above, it is of fundamental importance
that the terms of the credit should be complied with
before the bankerüs justified in negotiating the
seller's drafts drawn under the credit. This reveals
the doctrine of strict compliance. "The bank is under
obligation to its customer to observe the terms of its
mandate from the customer and accordingly to reject any
documents tendered by the beneficiary which are not
conform to those stipulated for in the instructions
2?for the opening the credit." " This point is illustrated 
by Bailhache J. in English. Scottish and Australian Banlc 
V. Banlc of South Africa ~ where he said: "It is 
elementary to say that a person who ships in reliance 
on a letter of credit must do so in exact compliance 
with its terms. It is also elementary to say that a 
banlc is not bound or indeed entitled to honour drafts 
presented to it under a letter of credit unless these 
drafts with the accompanying documents are in strict 
accord/
22. Bee Miller, p. 62
23. (1922) 13 LI.L.Hep. 21
A U ,
accord with the credit as opened," Also concerning
the exact documents, Sumner fsssssf. said: "There is noA
room for documents which are almost the sg^ me, or which
24-will do just as well."’'
24. Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Dawson 
r S r t o ^  (1927) ^  Ll7L.R^pr,“^p. 49-52 ;
see also Gutteridge and Megrah p. 84a
21.
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According to the businessman*s point of view the 
main purpose of credit is to facilitate the carrying 
out of the contract of sal© into effect and to give 
protection to the seller against possible risks. The 
difficulties concerning the legal aspect of the credit 
are largely ignored. It is quite true to say that "to 
a businessman nothing is simpler than the nature created 
by an irrevocable banker's documentary letter of credit* 
The seller of goods believes that, if he has such an 
instrument, he has the direct obligation of the issuing 
banîc, running in his favour, enforceable by him against 
the bank, that it will pay his drafts if drawn in
p  5
compliance with the terms of the letter of credit."’' 
Lawyers, however, do not see the credit operation in 
such a simple way. They endeavour to interpret the 
precise nature of different relationships arising under 
it which is a very hard task for them since "the practice 
of commerce is, as a rule, somewhat in advance of the 
development of legal doctrine and this is particularly 
true of the kind of mercantile instrument with which we 
are here concerned," Showing the difficulty arising 
under the credit Gutteridge and Megrah continue: "••• 
both Anglo-American and Continental lawyers have been 
hard pressed to define the exact nature of the legal 
relationships/
25* See Mead, pp. 300-301
26. See Gutteridge and Megrah, p. 21
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relationships created "by these transactions• In the 
case of jurisdictions governed by the common law the 
problem is two fold, i.e. (i) to define the nature of 
the contract created by the issue of the credit, and 
(ii) to surmount the obstacle presented by an apparent 
lack of consideration for the banker's promise to pay 
the drafts of the beneficiary. Either (it is argued) 
there is no consideration for the promise, or, if there 
is, then the consideration is insufficient because it 
does not move from the promisee (the beneficiary) but 
from a stranger (the customer of the issuing banker, 
usually the b u y e r ) T h e  difficulty above mentioned 
will not be encountered by Soots lawyers. This will be 
discussed in the nSit chapter^^.
Where payment under a documentary credit is 
arranged, four stages can normally be distinguished.
(i) The buyer (importer, applicant for the credit) 
and the seller (exporter, beneficiary) residing in 
different countries enter into a contract of sale in 
terms of which it is stipulated that payment of the 
goods must be made under a banker's commercial credit, 
(ii)/
27. See Gutteridge and Megrah, pp. 21-22.
28. See the offer-heId-open^and the unilateral
VO luntary obligation'/'"^Tnfra
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(ii) Following: the contract of sale, the buyer 
instructs a bank in his country (knoim as the issuing 
banlc) to arrange a credit in favour of the seller In 
his own country on the terms stipulated by the buyer 
in his instructions to the issuing bank.
(iii) The third stage is the contract between the 
issuing bank and the intermediary banlc (normally a 
banlc at the seller's country named as advising, confirm­
ing, negotiating, etc. The issuing bank asks the 
intermediary bank to advise, negotiate, accept and pay 
the draft upon delivery of specified documents 
by the seller*
(iv) The fourth and final stage is the communication 
of the intermediary banlc to the seller-beneficiary that 
the credit has been opened for him and that his draft 
will be met on condition of his strict compliance with 
the terms of the credit. Depending on the circumstances 
the intermediary banlc may add its confirmation to the 
credit*
The issuing of the credit by the banker in strict 
compliance with the buyer's instruction reflects the 
mandatory character of the buyer and banlcer relationship. 
However the nature of the banlcer's undertaking makes it 
different from the ordinary case of mandate* This 
reflects the independence of the credit stated in the 
general provisions and definitions of the U.C.P, 
Commenting on this particular point Miller notes: ".It 
will be observed that the decisions in the American 
courts/
courts proceed on the basis that, once the irrevocable 
credit has been opened, the contract Is with the bene­
ficiary and not with the buyer. In a Canadian case 
{Sovereign Banlc of Canada v. Bellhouse, Dillon & Co «
1911 23 O.R# (K.B.) 413) the Court observed: "When
a client induces a bank to give a letter of credit to 
a third party, he cannot of his own will compel the bank 
to cancel the letter, for the contract does not exist 
between the client and the banlc, but between the banlc 
and the third party." That dictum was> approved in 
American Steel Co. v, Irving National Bank, supra; but 
the theory of the contract between the issuing banîc and 
the third party (i.e. the beneficiary) has presented 
difficulty to English lawyers ...
In contrast with the previous stages, the last one 
has created great difficulties to lawyers and academic 
writers* leading them to speculation and confusion in 
analysing the banlcer-seller relationship. The banker 
is bound by his undertaking as soon as the''credit he 
sent reaches the seller's hand. Questions arise as to 
the manner in which the sending of the credit amounts to 
a binding contract and to define the legal nature of this 
obligation. What legal theory will be appropriate to 
fit this situation? It presents more difficulties to 
English lawyers who have to confront the problem of 
consideration*/
29, Bee Miller, p, 2?
consideration. The credit, recognised as the banker's 
promise to pay, can bind him without any consideration 
moving from the beneficiary* If there is no consider­
ation, there is, according to the English law, no 
contract. The banker will be justified in repudiating 
his presumed obligations. However in all the cases the 
banker is held to be bound by his undertaking. One has 
to bear in mind that a distinction exists between the 
banker's undertaking under the revocable and under the 
irrevocable credit " *,, when a banker issues a revocable 
credit he does not take upon himself, nor does he intend 
to take upon himself any legal liability. Until the 
banker accepts the seller's draft, the seller has no 
right against him; and even when the banker does accept 
the seller's draft, his liability arises under the law
relating to bills of exchange and not under that relating
30to letters of credit*" As for the banker's undertaking 
under an irrevocable credit, the question of the exact 
legal nature of the obligation arising under it is still 
open.
Regarding problems created by the banker's commercial 
credit, Miller says: "The difficulties involved in the 
study of the law of banîcers * commercial credits are 
sumptomatio of the interest which a close examination 
of the legal principles in relation to the commercial 
practice affecting such documents can engender. In this 
field/
30. Sa-e Davis, p. 66 ► utrtvfd be ca^ o L.
fo CJZvx. b-e <rW cVvu ©n A£U~u^  Ov^L. c
C^-^ r^cî^wLCe. /Ce  ^ t-ui/A
v^'/z . ^ h"t6 i !'
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field til© law is attempting to regulate a practice of
proven commercial worth in terms of legal theories of
general mercantile conduct which only imperfectly
reflect the true nature of the commercial credit and
of the practice and terminology of banlcors and others
engaged with it. Moreover, the modern commercial credit
is almost inevitably a facility devised to operate
internationally and thus reflects to a large extent
the international character of the law merchant before
it was received into the domestic mercantile law systems
of the various trading nations* One can see this
clearly when one studies the Uniform Customs and
Practice foa? Commercial Documentary Credits which was
adopted internationally in regard to the banking practice
governing commercial credits with the legal principles
so far as these can be discovered from the decision in
31which such questions have come before the courts,"
This diasertation deals mainly with the problems 
involved in the study of the legal nature of the banlcer- 
seller relationship under an irrevocable credit which 
has led to the putting forward of many theories. How- 
ever, no definite answer having a general application 
has yet been found, as will come to light in the follow­
ing chapters,
31 * S-ee Miller Foreword p * ii
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CHAPTER X
The first chapter takes into consideration 
attempts to solve the difficulties of the credit by 
way of seeing the different relations in the operation 
of the credit as forming component parts of one type 
of contract. This will bring us to examine seven 
main different theories. Some of these are advanced 
in both civil and common law countries and similar 
objections are raised against them,
1# The Guarantee Theory
In both major legal systems it was suggested that
letters of credit are guarantees. In the IT#S*A, this
1was put forward as early as 1813 and also in France
?at the beginning of this century".
The guarantee theory which was introduced to
explain the operation of the commercial letters of
credit la put in these terms? "commercial credits are
in fact merely contracts by which the bahïcer guarantees
3the due payment of the price of the goods,"
According to this theory the banlcer* by issuing 
the credit to the seller-beneficiary, undertakes to 
guarantee/
1, Walsh & Beechman v. Bailie 10 Johns (N»Y,) IBO
TÎSÎ31
2. See Decision of the Cour de Cassation Reg* 26* 1, 
1926, Dalloz per 1926* 1, 201, at p, 204 (Note of 
Hamel); S« 1926* 1, 353 at p, 354 (Note of Rousseau). 
Both authors disagree with the décision*
3# See Gutteridge and Megrah p. 291 Davis p, 67;
Miller p. 29
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guarantee the obligations of the buyer to the seller.
In other words, the banlcor guarantees that he will malce 
the due payment of the price of the goods sold, and 
despatched to the buyer in compliance with the terms 
of the contract of sale.
This theory could well apply to the ordinary forms 
of credit^. However, all text-book writers, as well as 
recent cases, reject the guarantee theory as a possible 
solution to the problem raised by the irrevocable credits. 
The first objection to the guarantee theory is that 
this theory ignores the banlter's primary obligation 
towards the seller. In the credit the banlcor acts 
independently and his undertaking is absolute, while 
in a guarantee the guarantor has an accessory obligation. 
This theory implies that the buyer as principal debtor 
would have failed to fulfil his obligation before the 
banlcer guarantor undertakes his accessory obligation. 
According to Bell: "Cautionary is an accessory obligation 
or engagement, a security for another, that the principal 
obligent shall pay the debt or perform the act for which 
he has engaged, otherwise, the cautioner shall pay the 
debt or fulfil the obligation," Criticising this theory 
Miller said g "If this theory is correct, the banlcer's 
obligations to the seller in the credit are accessory 
to/
4, According to Bell the Letter of Credit is either
mandate or caution, depending on whether or not the 
party supplying the beneficiary is personally bound 
with the beneficiary or is merely mandatory of the 
original debtor, (Comm, 1, 388-9 )
3, Bell Prin. p. 245
to the principal obligation of the buyer and conditional 
on the latter failing to implement his obligations,"^
In America the difference between a guarantee and 
a letter of credit is set out in Border National Bank
V, American National Bank of San
7Franciaco. Gal, as follows s
"A guarantee is a promise to answer for the payment 
of some debt, or the performance of some obligation, In 
case of the default of another person, who is in the 
first instance liable for such payment or performance#
A letter of credit confers authority upon the person to 
whom it is addressed to advance money or furnish goods 
on the credit of the writer,"
In France Stoufflet, objecting to this theory, said : 
"L*engagement du banquier créditeur a un caractère 
principal, tandis que celui de la caution est subsidiaire. 
Le bénéficiaire du credit irrevocable doit demander son 
règlement au banquier et non au débiteur du prix et ne 
peut donc se yoir opposer le bénéfice de discussion.
Au contraire, aux termes de l'art, 2021 du code civil, 
la caution n'est obligée de payer le créancier qu'à 
défaut du débiteur principal qui doit être préalablement 
discuté, sauf lorsque la caution avait renoncé au
/ y g
bénéfice de discussion ou s'était solidairement engagée," 
In the light of Scottish law, the guarantee theory 
is seen in the term of proper cautionry where the 
principal/
6* See Miller p, 295 Davis p, 68 ; Gutteridge and 
Megrah p * 29
7, 282 F, 73 at p. 77 (l922)
8. See Stoufflet p. 373
principal debtor is clearly bound as such and the
cautioners are bound as cautioners. In Stoufflet*s
criticism the exclusion of the benefioium ordinis is
mentioned; this would bo knoim. as an improper caution
where "the principal obligant and the cautioner are all,
ex facie of the bond, bound as principal, jointly and
severally, the cautioner(s) thereby impliedly renouncing
as regards the creditor the right of a cautioner, though
retaining them as regards the principal obligants,"^
In improper cautionry where there is no benefit of
discussion the banker, cautioner of the buyer, can be
looked to first without any objection* "The benefioium
ordinis had and has no place in improper cautionry, and
the creditor can proceed direct against any one or more
10of the ex facie co-obligants for the whole sum due,"
Does the fact that the banker's obligation to the seller 
is direct and ex facie principal show an indication that 
improper cautionry can give an answer to the objection? 
Improper cautionry allows the seller to claim the price 
of his goods from either the banlcer or the buyer,^^ 
However, before he can proceed to do so the buyer- 
principal-debtor must have failed to make his payment. 
Accordingly even here the banker cannot be said to act 
primarily and independently of other obligations. More­
over improper cautionry does not moan that the seller 
has/
9ft Walker p, 923
10, Mercantile Law Arndt. (Sc,) Act, 1856, Section 8 ; 
the benefit is excluded unless stipulated for in 
the cautionry obligation.
lias to su© the banlcer first. This may leave room for
the seller to claim the price of his goods from the
buyer in the first place whioh is not possible according
to the law of banlcer's commercial credit, % e  seller
has to claim payment from the banker initially, and, if
the latter fails to implement his obligation, the seller
11can then look to the buyer
The second objection to the guarantee theory is the 
independence of the banker's undertaking in such a credit 
The guarantee contract is collateral to and conditional 
on the principal obligation where the guarantor under— 
takes to pay a sum of money upon default of the main 
debtor. The guarantor is bound to the creditor provided 
the same debt remains. He is surety just for the risk 
he consents to talce. Should his position as guarantor 
be affected by any alteration of the contract between 
the creditor and the principal debtor he would be dis­
charged, "The cautioner is freed by an essential 
change, consented to by the creditor without the know­
ledge or assent of the cautioner, either on the
principal obligation or transaction, or in respect to
12the person relied on." Similarly this point is 
provided by the English Law: "Any material variation 
of the terms of the contract between the creditor and 
the principal debtor will discharge the security *,* 
when/
ll.Sfl. Saffron v. Société minier© Cafrika (1958) 100 
L.L.R, 231 at jp □ 253T”~^t is held that the 
banlcer' s duty is a principal one,
12. See Bell Princ. 259
when a person becomes surety for another in a speoifio 
transaction or obligation, the terms and conditions of 
the principal obligation are also the terms and con­
ditions of the suretyship contract to the prejudice of 
the surety, the latter will be free, it being the 
clearest and most evident equity not to carry on any 
transaction without the privity of the surety, who must 
necessarily have a concern in every transaction with 
the principal debtor, and who cannot as surety be mad© 
liable for default in the performance of a contract
which is not the one the fulfilment of which he has 
13guaranteed*" ^ In addition "the cautioner is entitled 
to plead any defence against the creditor on which th© 
principal debtor could rely*"^^
In an irrevocable credit, on the other hand, the 
banlcer is not released of his obligation if the contract 
of sale between the buyer and the seller becomes void 
or altered* This ia the consequence of the independence 
of the banker's undertaking as provided in paragraph 0 
of the General Provisions and definitions of the U.C.P, 
There is an absolute undertaking to pay by the banker 
irrespective of alteration o^ modification of the 
contract of sale provided the conditions of the credit 
are fulfilled by the seller, Dayis in his criticism of 
this point saidg "Under the law relating to guarantees, 
the/
13* Halsbury's Law of England 3rd Ed, Vol. 18 p# 502 
Mo* 922
l4. Bell Princ# 251; see also Walker p. 9 ^
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the issue of the letter of credit would preclude the
seller and the buyer from amending the terms of the
19original sales contract," Apart from this objection 
a guarantor can avail himself of possible defences 
against the creditor upon which the principal debtor 
can rely. However, this is not the case in the credit 
where the banker does not have such a right due to the 
fact that the credit is a separate transaction^^.
Some modern authors raised an objection saying that 
the guarantee needs to be proved by writing by the 
guarantor or bn his behalf. Being treated as a 
guarantee the credit which is communicated to the 
seller seems to be insufficient as such evidence and 
might be met by defences based on the Statute of Fraud®, 
Regarding this point Bayis explained: "the letter of 
credit could hardly be construed as complying with the 
provision of section 4 of the Statute of Frauds which 
requires a guarantee to be evidence by a note or memo­
randum in writing,"^^
This objection does not seem to be well founded.
It is a mere technicality of English law or law of other 
countries derived from or dominated by English law. It 
is equivalent to S,6 of the Mercantile Law Amendment 
(Scotland) Act 1856 in Scots law. In Scotland if the 
guarantee/
15* &ee Davis p, 68; also Gutteridge and Megrah p, 29
l6. Art, 3 XJ,G,P, See Delegation Theory p, 38-39 and 
also Miller p, 27
17* See Davis p, 68; also Gutteridge and Megrah p, 29
guarantee contract is in writing, signed by or on boîiàlf 
of the guarantor, that would constitute the contract.
No particular words are necessary to make the obligation 
a guarantee, if it is by its nature an accessory 
obligation for discharge of another's obligation. 
Stoufflet was right in rejecting this criticism when 
he said s
"De plus, le regime de la 'guaranty' détruirait
presque l'intérêt commercial du credit irrevocable non
par la possibilité qu'il ouvre au guarant d'opposer au
créancier 1'absence de 'mémorandum écrit * exigé par le
•Statute of Frauds' mais du fait que la modification du
contract originaire emporte libération du guarant."
Stoufflet is of the opinion that the condition of form
required by this Statut© does mot present any difficulty
concerning an irrevocable credit since the banker's
1 A
undertaking is practically always made in writing ,
Another criticism in common law countries is that
the guarantee, as any other promise, needs to be accepted
by the promisee, therefore this would allow the banker
to revoke his offer before it is accepted by the seller.
The possibility of revocation of the guarantee before it
is accepted by the creditor is not in line with the
irrevocable credit where it does not need to be accepted
and in the other hand it is held that the banlc is bound
19by his promise as soon as it reaches the seller 
To/
18, See Stoufflet p, 374
1 9 . Pester Ltd. v. Schenlcer & Co, j^ l923] l4 LI,L,Rep. 586
To argue that the seller accepts that guarantee by 
conduct or antecedent arrangement would lead to diffi­
culty and uncertainty, since it would, in that case, be 
binding only from the date of such acceptance. Concern­
ing this objection Davis said: "the issue of the letter 
of credit would amount to a mere offer capable of 
revocation at any time before its acceptance by the
seller."20
Another difficulty for common law laivryers in
adopting the guarantee theory of the credit is that it
fails to overcome the problem of lack of consideration.
According to English law a guarantee contract without
PIconsideration is void" # It is hard to see that there
is any consideration moving from the seller to the banker
to m ^ G  the latter bound by hie undertaking as soon as
22it is intimated to the seller ,
As far as the two objections above are concerned,
they do not seem to cause any problem to Scot© laivyers.
According to Scottish law a person could be bound
irrevocably as soon as he grants his obligation and if
he expresses this intention that obligation can be
enforced without consideration. It is not a prerequisite
P3of a valid contract" ,
In/
20, Be© Davis p. 68; also pp. BB-§— 35“--and—75» infra
21, French v, French (l84l) 2 Man & G 644; Horley v.
Boothby ( 182573 Bing lO?
22, See Gutteridge & Megrah Consideration pp, jZi -2
23, Paterson v. Highland Railway Co, (1927) S,0,(H,L,) 
32 at p, 38 ; see also Promise and Offer-held-open 
theory, infra•
lîi conclusion on© can say that to explain the 
ordinary forms of credit in terms of guarantee could 
not be an answer to those problems arising under a 
banlcer's commercial credit which presented those 
particular features. Above all, to treat the credit 
as a guarantee of payment for the goods by the banker 
would defeat the intentions of the parties, in the sense 
that the banker undertakes a primary obligation; and 
the adoption of a theory which does not fully, or 
necessarily, demand such a result, would entail the 
destruction of the business utility of the credit.
2# The Delegation Theory
ew  e»«W i f ln e 4 W e éwe «BV ww - e « * «IW»8*» ew#S&»
The "delegation theory" Is another attempt to
provide a solution to the difficulties arising under
the irrevocable credit©, It was put forward in France 
24by Hamel and presented many similarities to the 
assignment theory advanced in the common law countries*
In French law a distinction is made between the 
perfect delegation and the imperfect delegation* Art,
1275 Code Civil readaig "La délégation par laquelle un 
débiteur donne au créancier un autre débiteur qui 
s'oblige envers le créancier, n'opère point de novation, 
si le créancier n'a expressément déclaré qu'il entendait 
décharger son débiteur qui a fait la délégation,"
The perfect delegation does not have a meaning of 
assignment but a novation which discharges the délégant.
In other words the délégant is released from his liability 
when the délégataire accepts the délégué*© undertalting 
in hi© favour* The novation takes place when the 
creditor agrees as such and the intention of novation 
must be clear otherwise it will fall in the category of 
the délégation imparfaite* In the latter case the 
délégataire does not have an intention of a novation 
of the contract, the délégué is bound to him at the
first place but in case when the délégué fails to pay 
he sti:
Hamel/
25him, ll has right of recourse to the délegant ,
24, Hamel in a note on the decision of the Cour de 
Cassation Rep* 26,1,1926; Dalloz Rev, 1926 1 at 
P* 201
25# See Stoufflet p, 3775 Thayer 1047
Hamel suggested that the delegation imparfaite can 
be of assistance in giving an answer to the problem 
relating to the irrevocable credits* There is a great 
resemblance between the delegation imparfaite and the 
irrevocable credits in both the functioning and the 
legal relationship arising thereunder#
Til© independence of the banker's undertaking which
cannot be encompassed by many theories or even by the
assignation theory is provided by the delegation theory# 
Concerning this point Stoufflet explained that in the 
same way the banlcer' s undertaking in favour of the 
seller is independent of the buyer and banker relation­
ship, the undertaking of the délégué towards the
délégataire is independent of the délégant-delegué 
relationship# The cause of the obligation which the 
banlcer-délégu© undertakes in favour of the seller- 
délégataire is derived from the contract between the 
banker-délégué and the buyer-délégant# In most of the 
cases the banlcer-délégué does not know the seller- 
délégataire# The latter is a stranger to the relation­
ship between the délégué and délégant and is not 
concerned with it# He is concerned only with the 
obligation that th© banicer-d©légué undertook in his 
favour# Thus, according to the French delegation theory, 
the bahker-délégué cannot raise against the seller- 
délégataire defences which he has against the buyer- 
délégant, and the nullity of buyer-seller relationship 
dr non performance of the buyer-délégant's obligation 
will/
will not give any to the taanker««delegu© against
the seller-delegatalr©^^•
The Imperfect delegation presents its dissimilarity 
from a form of guarantee in the sense that it gives a 
principal obligation to the banker^delegue* The banker 
undertakes to bind himself regardless of the buyer’s 
failure to pay and in addition this obligation is not 
ancillary to the validity of the buyer and seller 
relationship. The view that the seller can look to the 
buyer in the case when the banlc fails to pay differs 
from joint and several liability because "each debtor 
is subject to a different cause of action, only inter# 
related by the same subject matter; upon payment by one 
the other is liberated*"^/
Although the French imperfect delegation reveals 
that it can provide a satisfactory answer to the autonomy 
of the irrevocable credit , it is still Inadequate to 
comply with all the fundamental requirements relating 
to the functioning of the irrevocable credits. The 
seller-delegataire has to give his acceptance to the 
delegation of debt before the relationship between 
delogu© and delegatair© becomes binding. So, in 
consequence/
26, See Stoufflet pp, 378-9
27* See KoBolchyk p* 386; Asquini N,S*S, at p* 239
et seq,
28, It gives rise to a new obligation between the
foanker-delégué and the seller-delegataire. It
resembles novation except it does not extinguish 
the delegant and delegataire relationship, See 
Rep, Civ, Délégation pp. 12-3, Dalloz Encyclopédie 
Juridique,
aonsequenoe, the moment of the establishment of the 
irrevocability of the credit which is of great import­
ance in the banking business would be defeated, Tlius 
it is not only the promise to be bound irrevocably by 
the banker which constitutes the contract but the s&ller- 
delégatdifelàsacceptanoe must be given. Consequently 
the délégué can withdraw the delegation before the 
délégataire * s acceptance• However, the irrevocability 
of the credit takes place only when it reaches the 
seller^^.
It is suggested that the délégataire * s silence 
after the delegation of debt has been communicated to 
him can amount to an acceptance, the consent is shotm 
by the lack of protest of the seller^ . Stoufflet is 
not satisfied with this suggestion? he said that the 
time of the irrevocability would not be clearly ascer­
tained , It would come into effect only from the date 
on which the silence could be so deemed * Stoufflet 
seems to point out rightly this view although the 
objection is not very strong.
The difficulty arises from the lapse of time 
between the communication of the delegation and the 
seller-delegataire’s acceptance « On© could say that 
the/
2 9 , See Stoufflet pp. 381-2; Thayer p, 1047? G, Fridel 
Crédit Documentaire ? Dalloz, Encyclopédie 
Juridique, Repertoire de droit commercial, Paris 
1956, Vol, I 6 8 k at p, 692 && 106
30. See Hamel, Note, Sons Req, 26,1.1926 (D. 1926,1.201)
‘ta. «
the seller’s antecedant acceptance would solve the
problem. However a difficulty still arises, if the
seller is supposed to communicate his assent in advance
that he will accept the delegation, the banlcer#seller
would become binding before the seller is Informed of
the delegation.
Another objection which is put forward against
most of the theories is that the delegation does not
correspond to the intention of the parties who do not
see the operation of the credit as a delegation
31imparfait© of a debt ,
In Scots law the delegation would be a form of 
the perfect delegation in French law. It is "a species 
of novation achieved by changing of debtor, discharging 
the former but in other respects leaving the obligation
unaltered," It could not be a help in explaining the
will Lt
credit as'' seen in the novation theory although there is 
great similarity between them. The conditions and time 
when the credit contract becomes binding are still open 
to objection and, in addition, the seller would foe subject 
to all the defences such as fraud, error, duress and 
undue influence which might have existed between the
seller and the buyer. This would defeat the purpose of
the irrevocable credit.
In/
31, See Thayer p, 104?-8; Chevalier, Juris Comm, de 
Bruxelles (1934) 93, 98 says s "Nous devons 
reconnaître que ces systèmes compliqués ne 
répondent ni à la réalité des faits, ni a la 
volonté des parties «"
-  (n
32. Se© Walker p, 608I Brk XXI, 4, 22; Bell Pria 8,376;
Gloag p, 258
In conclusion It can foe said that the French 
delegation theory can set out in a satisfactory way 
the independence of the irrevocable credit and give a 
more satisfactory answer to the problem than the assign* 
ment theory. Nonetheless, it is still foreign to the 
nature of the credit, and it fails to give an answer 
to the conditions, time or consequences, when the 
credit contract becomes binding#
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The Personal Bar or Estoppel Theory
m it (»(!;» «sa» ^  ffist «3P eæt» «CM ^  ^  ia« «C4 •«* Fi;> errf «m #W9 twa «Hti 4W» e*a> K » « n
The theory of personal bar by representation was
also suggested for the solution to the difficulties
arising from the irrevocable credit# This attempt was
only put forward in ooramon law countries and was found to
33be an inadequate solution to the problem
34Panicine on Personal Bar remarks t
"It calls up in the mind of the pleader such as rel 
interventus* homologation, ratification, adoption, 
acquiescence, taciturnity, mora, delay, waiver, standing 
by, lying by, holding out, and other phases of conduct 
»•# It may proceed by preventing disclaimer of title, or 
by preventing repudiation of an agreement instructed 
,aliunde though informally; or it may lead to the infer­
ence of implied consent# In each case it operates by 
conclusively Intercepting or shutting out all contrary 
pleas and proof."
The Earl of Birkenhead L#C* summarized the personal 
bar principle in Gattv v# Maclaine as follows;
‘The rule of estoppel or bar, as I have always 
understood it, is capable of extremely simple statement. 
Where A has by his words or conduct Justified B in 
believing that a certain state of fact exists and B has 
acted upon such belief to his prejudice, A is not 
permitted/
33» See Hershey pp, 16-I8 ; McCurdy p, 384 
34, 9.1
permitted to affirm against B that a different state
O K
of facts existed at the same time,
1fb.en applying the personal bar theory to the credit 
it is sot out in these terms g "When the banker issues 
an irrevocable credit^ he thereby represents, that he 
has in hand from the buyer sufficient money to meet the 
seller’s draft and that, in consequence, he is there­
after prevented or estopped from denying that he holds 
his money impressed, as it were with a trust on behalf 
of the seller.
According to the theory the banker who issues the 
credit to the seller represents that he has acquired 
funds or its equivalent from the buyer to meet the 
seller’s draft. Accordingly he is barred from denying
this. The banker would be in a position similar to the 
37buyer’s agent. Xt is difficult to say that this argu­
ment can give a satisfactory answer to the rights and 
liability of the parties arising under transaction 
involving irrevocable credits. Also it is said that 
the doctrine of personal bar or estoppel is not itself, 
as a rule, the basis of a cause of action, although it 
is a principle commonly found in many branches of law, 
and in both England and Scotland.
Depending/
35. 1921 S.C.(h .L.) 1 at p. 7
36, Se-e Davis p. 68 ; Gutteridge and Megrah p. 29 5 
Miller p. 29
37* To treat the baidier as the agent of the buyers 
see objections in the Agency Theory b. infra.
*Depending on the terms of the contract entered into 
between buyer and banlcer, funds may be lodged with, the 
badcer for the purpose of the credit. This constitutes 
a condition imposed by the banlcer on the buyer where 
financial soundness is unreliable. In this case there 
is an actual receipt of money by the banker and in 
addition there is an acceptance by the banker to meet 
the seller’s drafts. In practice the buyer does not 
put the banlcer in funds, the latter advances his om% 
money and will claim identification from the buyer at 
a later stage. This is one of the major purposes of the 
banker’s commercial credit. It allows the buyer to take 
advantage of the facilities provided by the credit.
Thus the theory of personal bar is somehow inconsistent 
with the normal use of the credit. There is a false 
presumption that, in issuing an irrevocable credit, the 
banlcer has in his possession the buyer’s money and that 
there is the banlcer’s aoceptq%ce of that money to meet
38the seller’s drafts* This cannot be true in most cases « 
The issue of the credit gives a right of action to the 
seller but the terms of the credit are not equivalent 
to the banker actually having the buyer’s money in his 
possession. "This view is manifestly insupportable in 
the light of the mercantile use of the credit."
The/
38. See Davis p. 70; McCurdy p. 584 and sub
39• Miller p. 29î Gutteridge and Megrah p. 30
The argument of estoppel was illustrated by the 
case Morgan v. Lariviere^^ where it was rejected. The 
main facts of the case are as fo&lows:
Larivlere entered into a contract with the French 
authority to supply them with ball-cartridges. The French 
authority arranged a credit with Morgan, the appellants, 
who acted as financial agents and issued a special 
credit of the sum of £40,000 in favour of Lariviere, 
the defendant, in these termsi "We are instructed by J, 
delegate of French authority to advise you that a special 
credit for the sum of £40,000, equivalent to one million 
francs, has been opened with us in your favour, and that 
it will be paid to you rateably as the goods are delivered, 
upon receipt of certificate of reception issued by the 
French ambassador or by " A dispute arose between 
the French government and Eariviere which caused the 
cancellation of the credit before the residue of £40,000 
had been paid. Lariviere sued Morgan for declaration 
that the fact of issuing a credit in his favour was a 
representation that Morgan had the sum of money stipulated 
in the credit in his favour and that Morgan was barred 
from denying this. The plaintiff’s counsel argued for 
an estoppel in these wordsi
"The declaration that they had opened a credit in 
favour of the respondent was a declaration that they 
had control over a fund of a certain specific amount 
appropriated/
4o. (1875) L.h. 7 H.l .G. 423
appropriated to a certain specified purpose. Surely 
that is the declaration of a trust as to that specified 
fund, and show that the fund itself was impressed with 
a trust* The Appellants could not afterwards deny
what they had thus written «•* "
Lord Cairns disagreeing with this view said in 
his decisions
"What is there in this letter which constitutes an 
equitable assignment, or what is there in it which 
impresses with a trust any particular sum of money? X 
can find no expression in this letter which could 
authorise such a conclusion. It appears to me to be 
simply a statement by a banker that he has opened a 
credit under instructions in favour of a particular 
person ,», but a credit of that kind may be operated 
upon also by means of cheques, or it may be operated
upon by simple demands, in any form, for the payment of
the sura for which credit has been undertaken to be given 
I read this letter as being nothing more than 
this 2 a s tatement by banlcers to a tradesman who 
supplies goods to a customer of the banker that they, 
a banker on behalf of their customer, will act as pay­
master to the tradesman up to a certain amount of money; 
but that, in order to call upon them to act as pay­
masters, he, the tradesman, must bring with him a 
oertqin certificate showing that the goods have been 
delivered to their customer. In a transaction of that 
kind there is nothing of equitable assignment, there is 
nothing/
nothing of trust; and it appears to me that any banker 
who had given an undertaking of that kind would be very 
much surprised to find that it was held that certain 
portion of the funds of his customer in his hands had 
been impressed with a trust, had been equitably assigned, 
and had, in fact, ceased to be the money of the customer, 
and had become the money of the tradesman who was to 
supply the goods."
Another objection is that according to the estoppel 
theory, the problem of the time of the irrevocability 
of the credit arises. The legal relationship will not 
exist until the credit has been communicated to the 
seller and the banlcer knew of the seller’s changing 
position on the faith of the credit. During the period 
between the issuing of the credit and the acknowledge­
ment of the seller’s acceptance there is a time lapse 
in which there is no juris vinculum between banker and 
seller so this would allow the banker to revoke his 
under talcing and free himself from his liabilities.
This is not in line with an irrevocable credit where 
the banker is bound as soon as it reaches the seller’s 
hand .
The application of the personal bar theory does 
not provide a satisfactory answer to the problem. It 
is unreal and does not correspond to the true intentions 
of the parties. On the other hand as the personal bar 
is/
p. 5 4
4l. See Davis p. 70 and also supra
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ia not the basis of the cause of action, it would be 
hard to apply it to the credit constituting by it© iééue 
an absolute undertaking and binding the baiilcer. at it© 
intimation to the seller.
4. The Assignment Theory
The Assignment theory has also been invoked in 
order to give an explanation of the banlcer-seller 
relationship. This attempt was advanced by McCurdy, 
an American author, ifho thought that it was given 
substantial support in both English and American cases^^. 
This theory suggests that when a contract is entered into 
between the buyer and banlc or, the benefit of the contract 
is assigned to the seller with notice to the banker* 
"There is some indication in the English cases, and in 
a few American cases, that the direct and indirect types 
of irrevocable import letters of credit might be treated 
as contracts between the issuing and drawee banlca and 
the buyer with an immediate assignment by the buyer to 
the seller*
This theory is said to be illustrated and supported 
by dicta in an English case Re Agra and Masterman’s
— 1 1, j it* " I II r iir —:^#Ww"niT-trr ,ii 'ii nw*tti»rmtiiiin'p i I Bin I ix fliiiM'Tiwrt i in mini i mini'i'i[r""if ..m
44Banlc a Ex parte Banlc ing Corporation where Agra and 
Mas ter man* s Banlc issued a general letter of credit to 
Dickson, Tatham & Go, in these words g "No# 394, you are 
hereby authorised to draw upon this bank at six months* 
sight, to the extent of £15,000 sterling, and such draft 
I undertake duly to honour on representation* This 
credit/
42* See McCurdy p# 583
43# Be^ McCurdy p* 5831 also Gutteridge and Megrah
P* 31; Davis p# 70; Miller pp# 29-30
44# (1867) L*R# 2 Ch. App. 391
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credit will remain in force for twelve months from this 
date, and parties negotiating bills under it are 
requested to endorse particulars on the back thereof*
The bills must specify that they are drawn under credit 
no* 3 9 k f of the 31st of October 1965#" Under his letter 
Dickson, Tatham & Co* drew bills for £6,000 and dis­
counted them with Asiatic Banking Corporation* The 
transactio||a were done according to the requisition*
Both Agra and Masterman’s Bank and Asiatic Banking 
Corporation went into liquidation* The liquidator of 
the Asiatic Banlc ing Corporation claimed from the 
liquidator of Agra and Masterraan*s Bank for the sum 
drawn on them by Dickson, Tatham & Co* The liquidator 
of Agra and Masterman’s Bank opposed these claims saying 
that Dickson, Tatham & Go. were indebted to them to an 
amount exceeding the amount on the bills* The fact that 
the liquidator of Agra and Masterman’s Bank tried to
set off the claims in that way did not find favour from
the court# They could not deny their liability because
there was a binding contract concluded between Agra and
Masterman’s Banlc and Asiatic Banking Corporation and 
the debt by Dickson, Tatham & Co* was Independent and 
unaffected by the contract between these two banlcs*
During the course of his judgment Cairns L*J* said; 
"But assuming the contract to have been at law a contract 
with Dickson, Tatham & Co., and with no other, it is 
clear that the contract was in equity assignable (if 
assignment were needed) to the Asiatic Banking Corporation, 
and/
and to have been by the writers of the letter intended 
to assign them, the engagement of the letter providing 
for the acceptance of the bills*"
The Lord Justice then explained that the defendants 
could not raise against the indorsees defences which 
they have against Dickson, Tatham & Co* since the 
parties intended the assignment to foe free from equities? 
"Generally speaking a chose in action assignable only 
in equity must be assigned subject to the equities 
existing between the original parties to the contract, 
but this is a rule which must yield when it appears 
from the nature or terms of the contract that it must 
have boon intended to be assignable free from and un­
affected by such equities," The implication of this 
statement might seem to be that to separate the assign­
ment from the equities is to talce the transaction so far 
out of the general concept of assignment that by defin­
ition the "assignment"is not an assignment at all in 
the ordinary legal sense. This is commented on by 
Finkelstein* "It has, however, been held that this 
rule is sufficiently modified in this type of case as 
to cut off equities between the original parties * By 
doing so, the court has destroyed that essential 
characteristic of an assignment by which it is dis­
tinguished from the negotiation of bills and notes#
So altered, it can scarcely be considered to constituting 
any longer a theory of assignment, but rather be deemed 
an/
an entirely new legal principle."
Although it is said that there is some indication 
that the assignment theory is supported by dicta in Re 
Agra, it is not clear how this case could be applied 
to solve the problem of the banker seller relationship#
The first objection is that dicta in Re Agra deal 
only with a general credit which is addressed by the 
issuer to anyone who cares to accept it. However, in the 
modern operation of the credit, the credit is in practice 
a special one which is addressed to a named beneficiary 
and perhaps restricted in its operation to a specific 
banlc* Regarding this point it is said; "while that 
explanation may be supported by dicta in Re Agra and 
Masterman’s Banlc e x parte Asiptic Banlc ing Corporation,
46that case was concerned with a general letter of credit."
According to the case above the credit is delivered
to the seller-beneficiary by the buyer. This is not
the ordinary functioning of the credit where the buyer
arranges for the credit with the issuing banker who
advises or sends it to the named beneficiary directly
or through the intermediary banlc. Tlie credit does not
com© to the buyer’s hand initially in order to be sent
to the beneficiary* The application of this theory will
47lead to the distortion of the facts of the credit.
The/
4-5. Sa© Flnkelstein p* 278
46. Bee Miller p. 30; also Davis p. 71
47* Bee Davis p* 71; Gutteridge and Megrah p. 31;
Miller p. 30; Kozolchyk pp. 586-7S McCurdy p. 583
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The second objection is that, as to the effect 
of til© assignation, the assignee is placed in the 
shoes of Ills cedent, he is entitled to exercise the 
right which the cedent had under the contract and is 
subject to any defence which the debtor had against 
the cedent I assignatns utitur jure auctoris '^ . 
Accordingly the seller is provided with the right 
assigned and. subjected to any defence which the bank 
may have against the buyer prior to the notice of the 
assignment. Thus frauds by the buyer in the inception 
would vitiate the transaction between banker and seller 
to the latter®© detriment. This would destroy the 
independence of the credit and will be incompatible 
with the true position of the seller in an irrevocable 
credit «
Considering the effect of the assignment, one 
may wonder whether according to this theory the seller- 
assignee is really placed in the shoes of the cedent
or not. Is the seller’s position towards the banker 
under the credit the same as the b u y e r ’s position 
toward the banker under the contract for the arrange­
ment of the credit? In the banker—seller relationship, 
the seller has his right against the banker from 
the l a t t e r ’s absolute undertaking in his 
favour/
4 8 , See Bell, Prin, l 4 6 8 ; Stair I, 10, l6;
III, 1, 20; IV, 40, 21; Ersk. Ill, 5, 10.
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favour fout according to this theory the seller’s right 
emanates as a result of an assignment subject to any 
defences available to the banlcer against the buyer.
The seller’s right is not identical in these two 
circumstances. One can say that there is no question 
of assignment in the credit and it is wrong to say 
that the contract between banlcer and seller comes into 
existence as the result of an assignment.
The assignment theory is still far from providing 
a good answer to the problem. It strains the facts 
and places the seller in the buyer’s shoes concerning 
right and liability arising from the buyer-banker 
relationship* It defeats the parties* intentions 
since there is no evidence to suggest that the buyer 
intends to assign the credit to the seller and, further­
more, the letter of credit does not prove it, A similar 
attempt under the Délégation imparfaite, advanced by 
Hamel, a French author, is recognised to be a better 
attempt as seen in the second theory above.
jfyj •
The Novation Theory
The main objection to the assignment theory, that 
the seller would be subject to any defences which the
49banker has against the buyer , did not escape McCurdy . 
He, then, advanced another argument under the novation 
theory. He sayss
"In order to preclude the setting up of these 
defences it would be necessary to go a step further 
and find a novation assented to in advance by the 
seller,
Then he explains t
"Defences against the buyer-assignor xfhich exist 
at the time of the novation could not be availed of 
against the seller-assignee by the obligor-bank even 
though the obligor- bank were ignorant of them at the 
time of novation,
In application of this theory the operation of the 
credit is described in these following words: "when the 
contract of sale stipulates for the buyer arranging the 
issue of an irrevocable credit, it is implied in the 
contract of sale that on the credit having been issued, 
the contract of sal© is with the seller’s consent 
novated so that the buyer drops out of the contract 
and/
49, See McCurdy p, 583
50, Be© McCurdy p. 584
51, Ibid, p* 584
and his place is taken by the Issuing bank which then
KO
undertakes his obligations#"
This theory shows that the contract of sale as a 
whole is novated and not Just the buyer’s obligation to 
pay the price of the goods# While this theory could 
give a solution to the independence of the irrevocable 
credit as McCurdy said above, it produces other problems. 
The banlcer, who is only under obligation arising from 
the credit contract, is involved in the whole contract 
of sale. It is still very difficult to say that this 
theory can be accepted as a good answer to the problem#
One of the objections to the adoption of the novation 
theory comes from the discharge of the buyer’s obligation 
under the contract of sale by the substitution of the 
banlcer’s obligation. The buyer drops out of the trans­
action and a new contract is entered into on the same 
terms between the banlcer and the seller. The buyer 
would foe completely free from his obligation and there­
fore the seller will be precluded from seeking recourse 
against the buyer when the banker fails to pay the price 
of the goods* However, in the ordinary operation of 
the credit, the seller does not release the buyer from 
his liability to pay the price under the contract of 
sale by demanding payment under a banker’s credit *
The/
52. Be© Miller p. 30; also Davis p. 71i Gutteridge
and Megrah p. 31
53* See Newman Industries Ltd. v. Indo-British Industries
Ltd. 1956 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 219 ; Davis p. 71,
Gutteridge and Megrah p. 31î Miller p. l4;
Kozolchyk p. 587
50 .
The buyer, in consequence of the discharge, would
lose all his rights under the contract of sale and
therefore he cannot insist on complete or exact
performance of the contract or reject goods sent to
him by the seller in a case where they do not conform
to the provision of the contract of sale or if fraud
54exists on the part of the seller^ « In addition, the
buyer will lose his rights against the banlcer who does
not act in strict compliance with his instruction,
i#e# makes payment against documents not stipulated in
the letter of credit*
This theory would also affect the banker’s position.
As the buyer drops out of the contract and is substituted
by the banlcer, the latter would become involved with
the contract of sale* The goods despatched by the
seller under the contract of sale will fall in the
banker’s hand. The latter would be involved in dealing
with the goods. "Further, the theory brings the banker
on the scene in the capacity of a dealer in commodities,
a role which he should not be called upon, and usually
5 5does not wish, to play."
Apart from the above objection it is also difficult 
to see how the seller’s consent is obtained for the 
novation of the contract. One may argue that the 
contract/
54. See McCurdy p. 584; Davis p. 75; Miller p. 30 
55# See Davis p. 71; Miller p. 30
5 ? .
contract of sale between buyer and seller could amount
to the seller’s consent* This cannot be true since
the contract of sale normally provides for the payment
of the goods by a banker’s credit* Tlaer© is no
indication of the seller’s consent that the buyer
would be freed from his obligations and substituted by 
56thes banker •
The novation theory is a presumptuon of the facts 
in order to give an answer to the difficulties arising 
under an irrevocable credit* It could solve some part 
of the problem but its adoption would lead to the 
distortion of the true facts of the credit* The buyer 
would drop out of the transaction and have no rights 
against either the banlcer or the seller, the banlcer 
becomes involved %fith the goods of the contract of sale 
and the seller loses his right against the buyer to 
pay the price in a case where the bank fails to do so.
In applying this theory the true nature and the purposes 
of the credit would be destroyed and the intentions of 
the parties defeated#
56. See Gloag pp* 250-9, 724-5
6 0 ,
6. The Agency Theory
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other attempts to solve the difficulties arising 
under the irrevocable credits are made under the agency 
theory# T \m suggestions had been advanced; firstly, 
the buyer acts as the agent of the seller and, secondly, 
the banker acts as the agent of the buyer,
(a) The buyer t the agent of the seller
Gutteridge and Megrah, who suggested this theory, 
said that when entering into the contract of sale, the 
seller may be deemed to authorise the buyer to act as 
his agent in arranging the payment in the manner 
stipulated. They explained their argument in these 
following terms 5 " .», what is it that is in the 
contemplation of the parties when a commercial credit 
is issued? The cardinal feature of the transaction is 
that the seller is not content to rely on the buyer’s 
ability on readiness to pay the price, but insists on 
payment being made in such a form as will obviate the 
possibility not merely of any danger of the buyer’s 
insolvency, but also of any resort to chicanery for the 
purpose of delaying or defeating payment* The seller, 
is, therefore, willing to make a contract of sale only 
on the basis that the buyer will procure an independent 
promise of payment made by a banker of indisputable 
integrity and solvency* The burden of arranging for 
this mode of payment is one which must obviously fall on 
the buyer* If a contract of sale is entered into in 
these circumstances there does not seem to be any reason 
why/
why it should not be hold that the buyer has the implied 
authority of the seller to arrange for payment of the 
prie© to be made in the manner stipulated for* There­
fore a buyer who, at the instance of the seller, procures 
the issue of an irrevocable credit in favour of the 
seller, may be deemed to act as the seller’s agent for 
this purpose, and there comes into existence a contract 
ancillary to the contract of sale, by which the bapker 
promises to pay the price to the seller in consideration 
of a promise by the seller to place him in possession 
of the document© of title of the goods,
Apparently this theory fits better with the facts 
of the operation of the credit from the contract of sale 
to the issue of the credit than any theories discussed 
above but nevertheless it still remain© open to 
objections*
According to the General Provisions and Definition© 
of the U.C.P* it is difficult to see, as in îaost of the 
theories, that the theory could solve the problem relat­
ing to the independence of the credit. The buyer, 
according to this theory, is acting in the capacity of 
the seller’s agent and not in hi© personal capacity in 
arranging the credit* Should the buyer’s delicts or
frauds occur in the performance of hi© duty, the seller
58would be liable thereunder * This will not foe in line 
with/
57» See Gutteridge and Megrah pp* 31-32 
58, See Gloag pp* 137-8; Walker 197-8
with the credit which, by it© nature, is an independent
59and separate transaction *
Another difficulty arises from the time-eloment, 
According to Ellingerg "The agency theory conflicts 
with the element of time* It would render the contract 
between the banker and the seller complete as from the 
time of the opening of the irrevocable credit, i.e. 
when the banker acts on the application form of the 
fouyer-agent, and not from the date of receipt of the
60irrevocable credit by the seller." According to
this objection the time of the irrevocability of the
credit comes into existence earlier than the usual
time, i.e. before the credit reaches the seller*© hand.
In addition to the above criticisms many authors
are of the opinion that the agency theory would load
to the most unsatisfactory consequences from the point
of view of the seller. The seller would be liable for
his agent’s delict in performing his duty^^, or if the
buyer fraudulently misrepresents the solvency of his
Spprincipal for the issue of the credit Regarding 
this point Davis said? "Hie objection to this theory 
is that it does not obviate, but rather encourages, 
•resort (on the part of the buyer) to chicanery’. If 
the/
59» Section G of the General Provisions and Definitions
of U.C.P., supra
60. Bee Ellinger p. 65
61. See Walker, Delict pp. 137-8; Walker Prince, p. 7'27
62. See Gloag pp. 197-&; Walker primes, p. 719
the buyer ia the seller’s agent, then the seller is 
liable for all torts committed by his agent, the buyer, 
in the ordinary course of his employment, even though 
the tort be committed by the agent for his oim benefit. 
Hence, if the buyer, in negotiating this ancillary 
contract with the banker, were guilty, for example, of 
fraudulent misrepresentation - it may well be as to 
the probity or solvency of the seller - the seller 
would be liable to the banker for that fraudulent mis­
representation, a liability which might offset the 
liability of the banker to make payment to the seller,"'
In considering all the difficulties encountered 
by this theory, one could say that it cannot provide 
what the parties to the credit bargain for and is unable 
to answer problems arising under the irrevocable credit,
(ta) The banker a the agent of the buyer
The second theory under the agency contract, 
originally advanced in the civil law countries, suggests 
that the banker, in acting according to the instructions 
given by the buyer, is deemed to perform a duty as agent 
of the buyer.
Like the previous agency theory this theory fits 
well with the facts of the credit. It is a matter of the 
construction of the credit itself. It seems equivalent 
to agency if the banker is following the instructions 
given/
63* See Davis; p. 72; Thayer p. 1040; ïCézolohyk p. 5#6; 
Ellinger p. 64; Miller p. 30
given by the buyer when he opens the credit, verifies 
the documents required thereunder and honours the 
seller’s drafts in compliance with the terms of the 
credit#
Xn French law, the agency theory falls in the
scope of a "mandat" xdiich is described in Article 1984
of the "code civil" in these termes
"Le mandat ou procuration est un acte par lequel
une personne donne à une autre le pouvoir de faire
quelque chose pour le mandant et en son nom*
Le contrat ne se forme qqe par 1'acceptation du
mandataire «"
It is true that there is a resemblance between
these txfo institutions# However, a difference ©merges
between an agent performing his duty and the banker’s
issuing an irrevocable credit# Unlike an agent, the
banker acts in his otm name as a principal * It is an
absolute undertaking on his part in the seller’s favour^^#
If there is a contract of agency between the buyer and
the banker, the latter would enter into the contract
69with the seller in the name of the buyer-principal *
In/
64. Art, 3 U.C.P. a
630 See Stoufflet pp* 370-1, op* eit*
In conclusion, one can say that neither approach 
of the agency theory gives an adequate solution to the 
problems arising under the irrevocable credits# The 
application of these theories would defeat the purposes 
of the banlcor’s commercial credit*
The Jus Quaesituni Tertio Theory
Xn the ordinary case, in contract, the general 
rule is that parties to the contract alone have a 
right to enforce it. The third party does not have 
any title to sue regardless of any benefit he has in 
it^^. However, there are exceptions in which the party 
foreign to the contract can acquire that right such as 
jus quaesituni tertio. This is recognised differently 
in the countries of different legal systems. In the 
discussion of the jus quaesituni tertio theory, an 
attempt is made to determine hoxf adequate its application 
would be to give an answer to the problem arising from 
the commercial credit in England and in Scotland,
(a) The jus quaesituni tertio theory in English lax^
The significance of the jus quaesitum tertio or 
the contract for the benefit of the third party theory 
is that there is a contract entered into by the buyer 
and the banker for the benefit of the seller xfho is 
foreign to it and according to this theory the seller 
would be allowed to enforce or sue under the contract.
The main difficulty in adopting this theory in 
England is that the English courts still reject the jus 
quaesitum tertio as a valid ground to give the third 
party the right to sue or enforce the contract. An 
agreement is not a binding contract unless it is made 
under/
66, Finn!© v, Glasgow & S.¥, Ry. [l857j 3 Macq. 75; 
Walker p, 567; T,B,Smith p. 7775 1956 Jur, Rev.
p, 6
under seal or for some consideration and the problem
arising in this theory is to show there is a privity
of contract and the consideration moving from the
seXler^'promisee« This point is clearly stated by Lord
Haldane in the following terms: "In the laxf of England
certain principles are fundamental. One is that only
a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it*
Our law knows nothing of jus quaesitum tertio arising
67by way of contract*"
However the theory of jus quaesitum tertio has its 
origin from the decision of Denning L* J , in Smith and 
Snipes Hall Farm Ltd* v* River Douglas Catchment Board^^ 
where the right of the third party to enforce the 
contract was discussed* The l#ord Justice explained it 
in the affirmative g
" a man who makes a deliberate promise which is
intended to be binding, that is to say, under seal or 
for good consideration, must keep his promise, and the 
court will hold him to it, not only at the s#it of the 
party who gave the consideration, but also at the suit 
of one who was not a party to the contract, provided 
that it \fSiB made for his benefit and that he has a 
sufficient interest to entitle him to enforce it, 
subject always, of course, to any defences that may 
be open on the merits *"
Explaining/
67* Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Go. v. Selfridge (1915) 
68, (1949) 2 K.B. 500; See Ellinger p. 49
uu ,
Explaining the meaning of* a sufficient interest he 
went on;
"Whilst it does not include the maintenance of 
prices to the public disadvantage, it does cover the 
protection of the legitimate property, rights and 
interests of the third parson, although no agency o r  
trust for him can be inferred. It covers, therefore, 
rights such as these which cannot justly be denied; the 
right of a seller to enforce a commercial credit issued 
in his favour by a bank, under contract with the buyer;
... "69
This statement xvas quoted by Gutteridge and Megrah
70with approval in 1955 but this point was abandoned in 
711962 in view of Adler v, Dickson and Green v, Russell,
McCarthy (Third P a r t y in the latter case the Court
of Appeal refused to follow Denning L* J,, preferring
the view of Lord Haldane, L. C, in Dunlop Pneumatic
73T y r e J ^ . V, ,Sj
After the decision of the House of Lords in Midland
74 75Silicon© Ltd, v, Scrutton Ltd,' and Besx/ick v, Beswick
it/
69. Ibid at p. 315
70, Gutteridge and Megrah, Laxir of Bankers * Commercial 
Credits 2nd ed,, 1955 at pp, 25-26
71# op. cit. 3rd ed,, I962 at pp, 27-28
72. [1959] 2 Q*B. 226
73. supra
74. (1962) A.C. 446
75. [1968] A.C. 58
69.
It \iras recognised that xfhat Denning L. J, observed in
Smith and Snipes Hall Farm Ltd# v. River Douglas Catch- 
76ment Board' about the right of the third party to the
contract cannot be regarded as good law. The general
principle concerning this argument stated by Viscount 
77Haldane, L.C, xms reaffirmed in Scruttons Ltd# v#
Midland Silicone Ltd,s " ,,, If the principle of jus 
quaesitum tertio is to be introduced in our law, it 
must be done by Parliament after a due consideration 
of its merits and demerits, I should not be prepared 
to give it my support without a greater knowledge than 
at present I possess of its operation in other systems 
of law. No-one xfho is not a party to a contract can 
sue or be sued on it or talce advantage of the stipulations 
or conditions that it contains," The English courts 
are still unwilling and reluctant to adopt the principle 
of jus quaesitum tertio recognised by the law of other 
countries which do not adopt the doctrine of consider­
ation or privity of contract#
Some authors tried to set out that the principle 
of jus quaesitum tertio has been accepted in the laxf of
England by interpreting the decision of the Court of
79Appeal in Beswick v# Beswick where a deceased Beswick, 
a/
76. [1949J 2 K.B. 500, supra
77. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co, Ltd. v, §
Ltd,t supra cit. ^
78. Supra, per Viscount Simoi^ p  t  ^ i 2 %
7 9 . [1968] A.C. 38
a coal merchant, assigned by agreement to his nephew
the assets of his business and his nephew, the defendant,
undertook to pay him £6*10s# per week during the rest
of his life and to pay his widow an annuity of £5 per
week after his death# The defendant nephew made one
payment of £5 to the widow of the deceased and refused
to make further payment.
In an action by the widow both as administratrix
of her deceased husband’s ©state and in her personal
capacity for the enforcement of the agreement the Court
of Appeal held; " •«« no third person can sue or be
sued o n a contract to which he is not a party but
where a contract is mad© for the benefit of a third
person who has a legitimate interest to enforce it, it
can be enforced by the third party in the name of the
contracting party or jointly with him; or - if he refuses
to join «*• by adding him as a defendant,"
% © n  the cas© x^ras appealed to the House of Lords,
Reid^ «fe=îr#°, made clear the right of the widow of the
deceased in stating; "Applying what I have said to the
circumstances of the present case, the respondent in
her personal capacity has no right to sue, but she has
a right as administratrix of her husband’s ©state to
require the appellant to perform his obligation under 
,80the agreement,"
It/
80# Beswick v# Beswick, supra
It is clear that English law does not know any 
right of the third party arising from the principle 
of jus quaesitum tertio. Thus it would be wrong to 
consider the seller’s right under irrevocable credits 
by this principle as far as English law is concerned. 
Concerning this point McCtirdy said: "Indeed, to construe
the letter of credit as a contract for the benefit of 
the seller would not only ignore the intention of the 
parties but would be unfortunate in its business results, 
in England and in some American states the seller as 
beneficiary could maintain no action against the issuing 
or drawee banli. Even in jurisdiction where he can 
maintain an action at law in his oxirn name his rights 
are derivative, and consequently he would take the 
benefit of the contract subject to all the defences 
which the issuing and drawee banks had against the 
buyer. Thus fra6d in the inception, supervening fraud 
failure of consideration, insolvency of the buyer, 
would all be defences available to the banks. Both 
from the seller’s and from the buyer’s point of view 
this result would destroy the value and the usefulness 
of the irrevocable letter of credit.
(b)/
81. See McCurdy p. 573; also Thayer pp. 1039-40; 
Mead p. 302
(b) Til© ;î«0 auaesitum tertio theory in Scottish law 
Jus quaesitum tertio^^ae a striking contrast to 
English law, is a well khown and accepted principle in 
the law of Scotland* Scottish law recognises that the 
parties to the contract can agree to confer the benefit 
of it on the third party and the latter acquires a 
right to sue for the enforcement of the contract* It 
is free from the doctrine of privity of contract and 
consideration.
Regarding jus quaesitum tertio Stair observedi 
"It is likewise the opinion of Molina, and it quadrates 
with our customs, that when parties contract, if there 
be any article in favour of a third party, at any time, 
est jus quaesitum tertio which cannot be recalled by 
either or both the contractors, but he may compel 
either of them to exhibit the contract, and therefore 
the obliged may be compelled to perform* So a promise, 
though gratuitous, made in favour of a third party,
that party albeit not present or accepting, was found
B?to have right thereby *"
Stair’s opinion concerning the recovation of the 
contract for the benefit of the third party xiras consid­
ered in detail and rejected by the House of Lords in 
iarmicha©:
82* Stair X, 10, 51 Stair quoted four oases to support 
his argument in xfhioh jus quaesitum was recognisred* 
Sui&T>licant v* Nimmo (l62? ) Mor. 77^0; Renton v*
Ai ton “ ’Tl"^  3'4 ) Mor# 7721 ; Ogilvi© v. Ker f 
Mor* 7740; Irvin# v* Forb©s'"'‘(T<376) Mor* 7722*
f J •
Carmichael v. Carmichael Exrx^^ where the jus^ * is—— ■ «      i»n*iMiii ii'iii i i i  i" 111Ilf'nrriif-MiHi-1.Tiiiiiti m*n-iJMiitWii ii"m-tiih. ii-ii iiiiiiiiwnwnrrgiri i> v
stated to become irrevocable xdien it is communicated
to the third party by any party to the contract or in
some other way* In his judgment Lord Dunedin saids
"The only rule to be deduced is that the more expression
of the obligation as giving a ’jus tertio* is not 
89
sufficient*" Thus, accordingly, the jus becomes 
irrevocable in various circumstances such as by delivery 
of the contractual document to the tertins, by regis­
tration for publication in the BooRs of Council and 
Session, by intimation to the tortins or by the tortins 
assuming an onerous undertaking on the faith of having 
or being promised a jus quaesitum* This conflicts 
with the view of Stair x^ ho is of the opinion that the 
irrevocability of the jus follows the concluded contract 
to the benefit of the tertius*
According to J* T* Cameron there are two distinct 
types of case* "In one, the third party has no right 
except by the donation of the original creditor; the 
original creditor acquires a bond or similar obligation, 
but although that bond is taken in name of the third 
party, that fact alone confers no jus quaesitum; in 
such oases, the original creditor is in some sense the 
owner of the sum in the bond until he transfers it to 
the tertius. To these cases Stair’s dictum does not 
apply/
83* [1920] s.c*(h*l*) 195
84* the right
85, Ibid. at p. 203
apply because, it appears of the operation of the rule 
’traditionibus non nudis pactis.* In the other class, 
that is, in all other cases, the third party acquires 
a right from the completion of an agreement in his 
favour and intended to benefit him| It is important to 
keep these elaâaes distinct, since it is the failure to 
do so which gives fiee to the conundrum "is it the 
existence of ^ jus quaesitum which makes the contract 
irrevocable or the irrevocability which creates the 
jus quaesitum?" true position is that in the first
class of case it is the donation, the traditio or its 
equivalent, wiioh gives the third party an irrevocable 
right: in the second class, it la the completion of
the contract xdiich has this result* A revocable jus 
quaesitum is a contradiction in terms#
Although the doctino of jus quaesitum tertio stated 
by Stair was not entirely accepted by the Scottish 
courts, it is, nevertheless, a well settled principle
in the law of Scotland had has long been recognised.
87The earliest case cited by Stair goes back to 1591*
The question Involved here is whether the jus 
quaesitum tertio theory can give a satisfactory answer 
to the problems arising under the irrevocable credit or 
not. The significance of this theory is that the buyer 
enters/
86. J. T. Cameron (1961) Jur» Rev# pp. 117-8 Jus 
Quaesitum tertio ; true meaning of Stair I,x,5; 
See also Walker pp* 568-9; T.B. Smith pp. 7?8“9
87. Wood V. Honour (l59l) Mor. 7719
75
entera into a contract xfith the banker qnd stipulates 
that the latter, having the role of a promisor, will 
undertake to issue the credit in favour of a third 
party, the seUler-beneficiary. The tertius acquires 
a right from jus quaesitum tertio contract and there­
fore can su© for the enforcement of his right*
Apparently this theory seems to fit adequately 
with the credit where the buyer entered into a contract 
with the banker for the arrangement of the credit in 
the seller’s favour and accordingly the latter qcquires 
a right against the banker for the enforcement of the 
contract* The different relationships of the credit 
operation are set out clearly by this theory and it 
provides a satisfactory explanation to the seller’s 
right arising under an irrevocable credit#
In jus quaesitum tertio the beneficiary is provided 
with a right of action in his oxm capacity to sue the 
promisor in cases where the latter fails to implement 
his obligation under the contract for his benefit. "In 
Scotland, if the provision is expressed in favour of C, 
he can nue and this is often designated by saying he
Q Q
has a jus quaesitum tertio*" In the same way the 
seller-benefioiary would have a right against the banlcer# 
Xn spite of these similarities between the jus 
quaesitum tertio and the credit, this theory still fails 
to/
Carmichael v. Carmichael Exox., supra p. 198
to provide an adequate answer to the problem, as do
the previous theories.
It is true to say that according to this theory
the tertius has his right of action in hiw o\m capacity
and this right is irrevocable, in some cases, as soon
89as the jus is communicated or intimated to him ^, 
Nonetheless, one may wonder about the origin of his 
right and the consequences it may have.
The jus of the tertius has its origin in the 
contract concluded by the stipulator and the promisor. 
It may not become absolutely vested till a later date. 
The promisor agreed to undertake to bind himself in 
favour of the tertius subsequent to the agreement met 
between the stipulator and himself. In other words the 
jus is somewhat dependent on the jus quaesitum tertio 
Gontract^^. However it is not the same with the credit 
where the banlcer-seller relationship comes into exist­
ence, not from the contract for the arrangement of the 
credit between the buyer and the banker, but by the
issue of the credit itself where the banker undertakes
91to bind himself irrevocably to the seller*
op
As stated above by Cameron there are two groups
of/
89. Carmichael v. Carmichael Excx.. supra
90. There is no banlcer’s absolute undertaking in 
favour of rhe seller.
91 * U.C.P. General Provision and Definition^^supra.
92. J.T. Cameron (1901) Jur. Rev. pp. 117-85 see 
also Walker pp. 1 T.B. Smith p^ 779
i i *
of cases in which the 'tertius* acquires his right* 
Firstly the jus is conferred on him when the contract 
in his favour between the stipulator and the promisor
is completed, and secondly when the jus is communicated
in some way to him or he has knowledge of the jus in
his favour* One can see that the first cas© does not
have any analogy with the irrevocable credit whidh
comes into effect when it reaches the seller’s hand*
The second on©, however, presents some similarity only
when the tertius’s right becomes irrevocable at the
moment of its communication to him by the promisor,
since in practice the credit is advised to the seller 
gq
by the banker *
The jus acquired by the tertius is seen differently 
by different authors* Regarding the tertius*3 title to 
sue, Glja^ g stated; "That principle, though it may 
entitle a tertius to sue on nonfeasance of a contract, 
will not entitle him to damage for misfeasance, because 
the real foundation of his title to sue is that the 
debtor/
93* The credit is normally advised to the seller either 
by tîtoe issuing bank or the intermediary banîc* The 
jus quaesitum tertio theory would allow the credit 
to be communicated to the seller in many ways 
xtrhich are not conform to the normal functioning 
of the credit, e*g* the banker may be personally 
barred by rel interventus if, with his knowledge, 
the seller alters his position on the strength of 
the anticipated credit, their obligation arising 
from the rei interventus and not the issue of the 
credit. As regards time, this will be inconsistent 
with the credit. On the other hand personal bar 
could render the banlc similarly liable whatever 
theory of the credit is used.
debtor in the contract has agreed to be liable to him, 
and it is not to be presumed that the debtor in a 
contract has agreed to be liable to a tertius in 
respect of his defective performance."^^ Similarly, 
Gloag and. Henderson la# doxfn; "It has been authorit­
atively stated that although a third party may have a 
title to enforce an obligation under a contract he can
never have any contractual right to sue for damages for
Q 9the defective performance of the contract#" According 
to the abcm authors, the tertius*s right is restricted 
within certain limits. He is not entitled to sue for 
damages for misfeasance. This shows a great difference 
between the third party’s and the seller’s right. In 
the credit the latter has an absolute right against 
the banlcer to exact the contract, provided he complies 
with the terras of the credit.
However, some authors do not agree with the view 
that the right of the tertius is so restricted. Smith 
is of the opinion thati "It is accepted in Scots law 
that general damages may be awarded for breach of a 
unilateral and gratuitous promise in cases where the 
jus quaesitum tertio is not under consideration. The 
most familiar example possibly is breach of a promise 
to keep open an offer for acceptance within a particular 
time* It is difficult to appreciate w hy in principle 
the/
94, S e e Gloag, The Law of Contract, p, 239
95# Gloag and Henderson, Introduction to the Law of 
Scotland, 6th ed, p, 91# Also reproduced by 
Professor Walker in Laxv of Damages in Scotland, 
p. 87
*the preliminary intervention of a stipulator to secure 
the promise ^n favorem tertii should reduce the liability 
of the promisor to the promise© (tertius) when the 
promisee claims by virtue of a jus quaesitum tertio. 
Indeed any such distinction seems quite Inconsistent 
with those doctrines of consensual obligation which 
were recognised in Scotland even before Stair restated 
them# Since the promisor in the Stipulâtio alter! 
relationship may well have accepted some consideration 
from the stipulation, it would be surprising if his 
liability to the promise© were less in such a situation 
than if he had merely spontaneously and gratuitously 
promised some benefit to the promise© *#• " This 
argument seems to foe stronger than Gloag*s statement 
so if the right of the tertius under the contract in 
his favour is not limited or restricted due to the 
promisor*8 misfeasance, it would have a great resemblance 
to the credit# On this point, therefore, the objection 
to the seller’s right would not be a good one#
Another objection to the jus quaesitum tertio is 
that as the consequence of the dependence of the jus on 
the contract between the stipulator and the promisor, 
thOD right of the tertius would be recognised only subject 
to any defences which could have been valid against the 
stipulator, @*g. fraud, Concerning this point Lord 
Keith/
96# T#B, Smith, 1956 Jur# Roy, pp# 20-21; see also
Walker p# @^9
Keith said s "X 'see no reason in principle why it 
should not operate as part of the laxf of jus quaesitum 
t e r t i o . This is not the case in the irrevocable 
credit where the banker-seller contract is provided to 
be independent from other contracts and the seller is 
free from any defences that the banker has against the 
bytyer^^ #
Xn view of the failure to correspond exactly to the 
facts of the credit and to provide the independence to 
the banker-seller relationship, one could say that the 
jus quaesitum tertio is still inadequate to provide a 
solution to the problem under the irrevocable credit.
97. Spirit of the Laxf of Scotland p* 28; also T.B*
Smith Studies p. 197 . _
98. U.C.P. General Provisions and Definition, supra
CHAPTER II
Til© second chapter concerns the theory which 
treats the irrevocable credits as established by and 
based on a general mercantile usage. Due to diffi­
culties caused by the doctrine of consideration and 
privity of contract, this theory is favoured by some 
authors of common law countries because it would be 
the only ground to assist them to solve the problem 
arising under the irrevocable credit.
The^Merqantile^Specialt^^Theorj^
The second category of discussion to be seen in 
this dissertation is the mercantile specialty theory 
which treats the irrevocable credits as a mercantile 
specialty* It is considered to be somewhat of the 
nature of a negotiable instrument, the banlcs having a 
position similar to that of an acceptor of a bill of 
exchange •
In most civil law countries, due to the separation
of the civil and commercial code, negotiable instruments,
known as mercantile specialty in common laxf countries, 
are treated separately as part of the commercial code*
In the Anglo-American world, the us© of the term
’specialty’, as applied to mercantile instruments, was 
used to denote exceptions to the traditional rules in 
the/
1. See Finkelstein op. cit* at p. 289? Thayer p. 104l; 
McCurdy p * 363
u  A , »
the usual common laxir contract obligations# Thus the 
bill of exchange, the promissory note and cheque are 
known as mercantile specialties* These exceptions more 
justified by pfoof of customs of merchants#
Regarding the influence of the laxf merchant Bell
states: "The lax^ -*morchq.nt is universal* It is part of
the law of nations, grounded upon the principles of
natural equity, as regulating the transactions of men
who reside in different countries, and carry on the
intercourse of nations, independently of the local
customs and municipal laxvs of particular states* For
the illustration of this law, the decisions of courts,
and the writing of laxfyers in different countries, are
as recorded evidence of the application of the general
principless not making the law, but handing it down;
not to be quoted as precedents or as authorities to be
implicitly followed, but to be taken as guides towards
the establishment of the pure principles of general
Pjurisprudence.
The mercantile instruments were adopted in both 
major legal systems, having their oxto characteristics 
although partaking of the nature of the existing 
institutions* The irrevocable credita]ha\ve their oxm 
particular features in their form, certainty or transfer 
partake of the contractual nature which resembles agency, 
cautionry, delegation or jus quaesitum tertio.
Many/
2* Bell Com. Preface to Author’s Edition p* 4l; see 
also Miller Preface p« 11
Many authors favour the mercantile specialty 
theory since a proper Iqgal theory cannot be found to 
fit the credit. Accordingly Finkelstein is of the 
opinion that; "There can be little doubt that in 
practice the irrevocable credit is regarded as in the 
nature of a mercantile specialty. The seller in fact 
regards the bankfs promise as irrevocable because of 
the manner in which it is made. The average business­
man, though ignorant of legal technicalities, is 
conscious of the fact that bills, cheques, and notes 
are sui generis, that they are contracts peculiar to 
themselves, and that they have little in common with 
usual contract. He would be inclined to classify 
letters of credit with this group rather than with the 
usual type of contract. There can also be little doubt 
that this reaction to the nature and use of letters of 
credit is sound. Nor can it be denied that this has 
also been the attitude of the courts in adjudicating 
rights under irrevocable commercial credits. It has 
been recognised that they are a definite class of promise 
to extend credit or to pay money, made under certain 
conditions and with a certain essential uniformity.
If any formal theory be needed as to the rights of the 
seller under this type of instrument, clearly such right 
must be regarded as based on the view that the irrevoc-
o
able credit is a iiexf type of mercantile specialty."
In/
3. See Finkelstein pp, 289-90; also Thayer p. 104l
In considering the letter of credit to be a 
mercantile specialty, this theory is somehow satis­
factory at first glance since the credit is construed 
as it is expected to be by the businessman in the 
usual practice of world ^rade as agreed by many countries 
and set out in the Uniform Customs and Practice, He is 
of the view that the seller acquires the right against 
the banker under the irrevocable credit because it ia 
deemed to be so in the world of business transactions.
The objection may arise that this theory does not 
male© any attempt to explain the legal nature of the 
obligations of the parties arising under the credit*
To accept a nexir principle in a legal system, it 
must be considered that the principle in question, in 
spite of its international usage as in the case of 
commercial credits, should not contradict any principles 
of law existing in that country.
Some authors are opposed to this theory, which 
treats commercial credits as a mercantile specialty 
soraox^ hat in the nature of the bill of exchange, due to 
their lack of uniformity " ,,# these letters have not 
reached that point of uniformity that bills of exchange 
and promissory notes have attained. There are many 
types, some of which are considered in the business 
world as creating binding obligation upon issue, and 
others of which are looked upon as revocable at will.
If business ideas on the subject are not uniform, 
judicial ideas are chaotic « Moreover, letters of 
credit/
credit vary in formality from telegraphic communications 
and simple memoranda of letters written in ordinary 
epistolary form. There is considerable variation in 
the form and in the transaction which gives rise to the 
latter. For an instrument to be a specialty it must 
have reached a high degree of formality."^ However, 
in view of the increasing us© of commercial credit in 
overseas trade nowadays, attempts to standardise it have 
been made or are in the making. It is well knoxm. that 
due to the adoption of the Uniform Custom© and Practice, 
the practice regarding documentary credits has reached 
a certain level of certainty and Uniformity*
While agreeing that letters of credit are well 
established in practice, some writers do not think that 
this in itself overcomes the lack of consideration in 
common law. Concerning this McCurdy ©ayes Even
if a letter of credit be recognised as a mercantile 
specialty, it doe© not follow that consideration is 
unnecessary. The trend of common laxf has been to give 
effect to the custom of merchants which make© certain 
chose© in action negotiable, but not t© give effect to 
the custom of merchant© xfhich makes specialty promises 
binding without consideration. There is an essential 
difference between recognising, in furtherance of commerce, 
that certain choses in action are assignable so as to 
confer upon the assigne© original in distinction to 
derivative/
4, Gee McCurdy p, 564; also Finkelstein pp, 293-4
oo *
derivative rights, and in recognising that certain 
promises need no consideration to be legally enforce­
able, In the one case the question relates to the 
transferability of an existing legal right; in the 
other case the question concerns the creation of that 
right. To some extent, to be sure, especially in the 
matter of negotiable instruments, the common law has 
expanded and modified its strict conception of xirhat 
constitutes consideration* But the lav/ has never 
abolished its necessity*"
The common lav/ affected by the lax/ merchant 
recognises the negotiability of bills and notes but it 
still requires consideration to exist as between the 
inmiediate parties. It does not recognise a promise to 
be binding x/ithout consideration. Under the Bills of 
Exchange Act ^ lS82ÿ, in^Bx^-ti-sh fax^  a bill can be 
created without consideration (e,g. by ’accommodation* 
under S,28) and may also be negotiated without consider* 
ation; however, the holder without value does not have 
the full rights of holder, particularly of a holder in 
due course: the full effect of the bill does not come
into effect without value, i,e, consideration. The 
fact that the usage and practice of world trade provide
that the irrevocable credits are binding from the date
6at x/hich they reach the seller’s hand means that such
usage/
5, Gee McCurdy p, 365; Finkelstein p, 290; Thayer 
p. 104l
6,  See Ar t - , — ^14-  vj-o+c M Stvpva.
usage would be contrary to the common law principles 
which require for the enforcement of a promise the 
presence of consideration from the promisee# This 
would be ex nudo pacto non oritur actio* Concerning 
this difficulty Gutteridge and Megrah say; "No apology 
is needed, therefore, for an attempt to analyse the 
legal characteristics of a banker*© commercial credit
7in the light of the rules of the Common Law of England#" 
By those rule© of common law consideration is still 
necessary to constitute an obligation# The term 
•mercantile specialty* has until nox/ been appropriated 
to a class of obligation in which consideration still 
has a place# Thus before a credit can be legitimately 
described as a ’mercantile specialty’ in the technical 
sense, either the application of the doctrine of 
consideration must be modified or the term ’mercantile 
specialty’ extended to make it possible for it to apply 
to p. further type of obligation not requiring consider­
ation# Neither position has yet been reached by English
law, and so in that sense the ’mercantile specialty^
8theory does not explain the commercial credit *
In summary it is recognised that the mercantile 
specialty tneory could be an answer to the problem# The 
commercial/
7* Gee Gutteridge and Megrah p# 22
8 , The theory may equally have force if there is some 
other concept available capable of explaining the 
credit in established legal terms# It will be 
argued that in Scots law there is indeed such a 
concept#
ü O
commercial credits have been governed by the lax/ 
merchant through its whole history, recognised inter­
nationally and are fro© from the constraint of the 
domestic law in the same way as a bill of e&ohange.
It is well known that the courts in common lax/ countries 
have recognised and. enforced the legal rights of the 
parties to the credit regardless of their well- 
established doctrine of consideration*
Finkelstein, x/ho favours this theory, is of the 
opinion that commercial letters of credit will soon be 
recognised as a mercantile specialty, He states;
" * « • To viex/ the irrevocable commercial letter of 
credit as a mercantile specialty of a nex/ type, most 
clearly, simply, and satisfactorily explains the right 
of the parties, harmonise© the decisions of the past, 
and makes more dependable the future development of the 
law, thus enabling both banker and merchant to proceed 
with their activities with confidence and assurance.
The theory that the irrevocable letter of credit is a 
mercantile specialty has nox/ for some time been acted 
upon and has boon functionally adopted* The ability of 
the lax/ to develop with the needs of commerce has not 
yet disappeared, and with the growing consciousness on 
the part of the courts of the true status of the 
commercial credit, its formal recognition as a mercantile 
specialty cannot be long delayed*"^
It/ .
9* Gee Finkelstein pp* 294-5; also McCurdy p# 564
It was also argued that only instruments known to
the ancient law merchant could achieve negotiability
by commercial usage* However, Goclcburn C* J., in
delivering a judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber
explained that modern mercantile usage can create a new
type of negotiable instruments "Usage, adopted by the
courts, having been thus the origin of the whole of
the so-called law merchant as to negotiable securities,
what is there to prevent our acting upon the principle
acted upon by our predecessors, and followed in the
precedents they have left to us? Why is it to be said
that a new usage which has sprung up under altered
circumstances, is to be less admissible than the usage
of past time? Why is the door to be now shut to the
admission and adoption of usage in a matter altogether
of cognate character, as though the law had been finally
stereotyped and settled by some positive and peremptory 
10inactment?" Also a recent decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Malas v* British Xmex Industries Ltd.^^ shows 
an indication to support this argument where Jenîcin L. J« 
said: " , the opening of a confirmed letter of credit
constitutes a bargain between the banker and the vendor 
of the goods which Imposes upon the bankea? an absolute 
obligation to pay •* « An elaborate commercial system 
has/
10* Godwin v# Roberts (l875) h«R* 10 Exch, 337 at 
p. 352
11. [1958] 2 Q.B, 127 1 All E.R. 262
y V  #
has been built upon the footing that banlcer * s confirmed 
credits are of that character, and, in toy judgment, it 
would foe %;rong for this court in the present case to 
Interfere with that established practice*"
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CHAPTER 111
The third chapter deals with theories under the 
form of ordinary contractual relationship. Unlike the 
first chapter the banker-seller relationship is here 
set out separately. It is suggested that there is an 
offer by the seller which is accepted by the banlcer or 
vice versa. Accordingly four attempts would be examined 
in the following discussion,
1, The Seller's Offer Theory
Another attempt was advanced by Thayer^ to which
he gave no name but subsequently it has been named the
o
seller's offer theory by Davis • It is a variant of
3the offer and acceptance theory • The position of the 
banker and seller are reversed, the seller becomes 
offeror and the banker the offeree. The seller's 
offer is presumed to be contained in the contract of 
sale offering to surrender the documents of title to 
the goods to the banlcer and which the banlcer accepts 
by opening an irrevocable credit. Miller described the 
theory in these terms: "By stipulating in the contract
of sale for an Irrevocable credit the seller made an 
offer to surrender the documents of title to the banlcer 
instead/
1, See Thayer pp, 1036-7
2, See Davis p, 72  
3• infra
instead of to the buyer, in exchange for the banker's
undertaking to honour the seller's drafts*"^
According to this theory the seller's offer given
in the contract of sale is presumed to be communicated
to the banlcer through the buyer in arranging for the
credit as at this stag© there is no communication yet
between the seller and the banker. The contract between
banker and seller would become binding at the time when
the banlcer accepts the offer* i»e# when he issues an
irrevocable credit to the seller* This is expressed by
Thayer in these terms: "From the moment that the letter
of credit is issued by the banlc a contract arises between
the banlc and the seller whose terms are evidenced by a
letter sufficiently understood in accordance with the
5custom of merchants to warrant such conclusion,"
Unlike the offer and acceptance theory discussed in the 
following chapter* Thayer's theory would help to solve 
problems regarding the act of acceptance and lapse of 
time where the offerer can cancel his offer. However 
this theory is rejected by some authors who consider 
it to be inadequate to give a good answer to the 
difficulties of the banlcer-seller relationship under 
an irrevocable credit.
The first objection is that "this theory is not 
applicable to clean credits, in which the banker does 
not/
4, See Miller pp* 30-1; also Davis pp. ?2-3 
3# See Thayer p. 1057
not require the surrender of the documents to him,
It is true that in some cases the contract of sale
provides that the buyer should arrange for a clean
credit. The banker following the arrangement with
the buyer would undertake to honour the seller's
7drafts without any documents attached , Hence there 
would not be any documents which will constitute the 
seller's offer, to comply with the theory. This is 
an interesting argument, but it does not seem to be 
a strong objection, since in the ordinary dealing of 
an irrevocable credit the transaction normally involves 
delivery of documents.
Another objection to this theory is that "it is 
perhaps also slightly unreal in that it involves that 
the seller may be regarded in law as under contract to 
a person of whom he is unaware, since the contractual 
relationship would commence from the issue of the credit,"^ 
If the buyer is presumed to be the seller's agent, would 
this argument still stand? The seller in the normal 
trade transactions wants to be sure that the price of 
his goods will be paid. He does not seem to worry much 
about the banker except for his solvency and integrity. 
Therefore/
6, See Davis p, 73, also Miller p, 3i
7, This occurs when the customers are financially 
reliable or the banlcer has been put in funds, so 
that the documents are not necessary for the 
banl^ ier's security,
8, See Miller p, 31; also Davis p, 73
9 4 ,
Therefore if there is a term in the contract of sale 
that the buyer should arrange an irrevocable credit 
xtfith a banlter of indisputable integrity and solvency 
and the buyer (seller's agent) arranges for the credit 
according to the instructions of the seller, his 
principal, then the above argument would not be a 
strong one. However, according to section 0 of the 
General Provisions and Definitions of the U,C,P, for 
Documentary Credits (l9?4 Revision) it is not possible 
to argue that the buyer is the seller's agent. This 
would be subject to criticisms discussed in the agency 
theory.
Some authors oppose this theory because it could 
not give an adequate answer to the time of the formation 
of the credit contract* The seller would be bound to 
the banker when acceptance is made, i*e* when the credit 
is issued. Regarding this criticism Davis states; "The 
theory also requires that the seller is bound by the 
contract to the banlcer from the moment the credit is
Q
issued,"^ However, the irrevocability of the credit
10comes into existence when it reaches the seller's hands.
It could be argued that according to some technical 
rules relating to offer and acceptance, the acceptance 
does not need to reach the offerer for the conclusion 
of/
9* Gee Davis p, 73
10* This point is illustrated by an English case Dexter 
Ltd, V* Schenlcer & Co, (1923) l4 Ll,l Rep, 58%
yjm
of the contract* This may be the case when the parties
agr©o to use the Post Office as their agent or the
Post Office could be assumed to be one of the parties'
agent. Thus the acceptance does not need to reach the
offeror. The banker-seller relationship becomes binding
11
as soon as the banker posts the letter of credit ,
Thayer explaining this situation says g "In view of
the prior stipulation for the credit by the seller in
the contract of sale, It seems fair to say that its
communication is completed when it is entrusted by the
banlc to the post or to the telegraph office, as the case 
12may be," If there is such a term in the contract of
sale or the Post Office could be presumed to be the
seller's agent in this case, the above objection could
fall* However, in practice, the Post Office is not
considered to be party to the credit, and indeed if it
were, this might cause great difficulties where the
letter of credit, although posted, fails to reach the
seller; and the business purpose of the credit would be
he
frustrated because the seller would not^ship the goods 
until receipt of the credit.
According to this theory it is not clear how the 
offer is communicated to the banker to malce him bound 
before the tender of documents by the seller. It is not 
possible that, at this stage of the credit operation, 
there/
11, Bell, Comm, I, 3 k k
12. See Thayer p, 1057, not© 129
9 6 .
there is communication of the offer by the seller him­
self to the banlcer. On© oould assume that the buyer 
acts as the seller's agent in communicating the seller's 
offer to the banker or is his del credere agent in 
guaranteeing payment by the bank. In so assuming, this 
argument would defeat the independence of the credit 
and be open to objections raised against the agency 
theory#
The seller, according to this theory, offers to 
surrender the documents of title to the goods in return 
for the banlcer*s undertaking to issue an irrevocable 
credit in hist favour. The contract is concluded when 
the banker accepts his offer. Following the formation 
of the contract, the parties are under obligation to 
perform their duty. The theory would compel the seller 
to perform his duty. Failure to do so will put him in 
breach of contract. However, in the credit, the failure 
to surrender the documents does not put him in breach 
of contract. 'The banker would not have any right 
against him for such.
The seller's offer theory, one of the variants of 
the offer and acceptance theory, is of help to give an 
explanation to certain problems which the other variants 
fail to solve. However, as soon above, the theory is 
still not adequate to provide a satisfactory answer to 
the problem. It may not give to the credit its 
independent nature, defeats the parties' intentions 
and/
yy.
and. leads to distortion of the facts# Moreover, it 
seems to provide the banker with a right (above) 
which does not exist in practice*
2# Mead's Theory
The problem of validity of the irrevocable credit
due to the lack of consideration is the most trouble-
13some to overcome for common law lawyers. Mead in 
his theory gives an explanation that the seller's 
right under the credit contract can be solved on the 
basis of an ordinary contractual obligation. He 
suggested that there is a contract between the banlcer 
and the seller under an irrevocable credit in which 
the seller is offeree and consideration is furnished 
by the buyer to the banker on behalf of the seller,
1^ other words the consideration for the banlcer * s 
undertaking is given in the arrangement for the credit 
when the buyer promises to indemnify the banlcer against 
the issue of an irrevocable credit. To support this 
theory Mead cited a number of cases which show that 
there is a binding contract between the banlcer and
l4seller but not all of them clearly support his argument ,
1 ^In Gelpek© v, Quentell the plaintiff banker issued 
an irrevocable credit in the seller's favour on the 
buyer's/
13, See Mead pp. 302-5
1.4, Gelpeke v. Quentell (1878) 74 N,Y, 599» Sovereign
Banlc V, Bellhouse Dillon & Go. (l9l4) 23 Omb. K.B.
4i3» American Steel Go. v. Irving Nat. Banlc (C.C.A,
1920 ^ V. National City Bank
(1920) 193 App. DivT8*49, 184 h.y, Supp, 66I; 
Doelger v. Battery Park Nat. Bank 201 App. Div.
515» 194 N.Y.S. 582 at 587
15. Supra
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buyer's request# Subsequently the buyer ordered the 
banker to revoke the credit; the bahker declined and 
paid the seller's drafts* The buyer refused to indemnify 
the banlcer who, aocordilngly, brought an action for pay­
ment# It was held by the Court of Appeal of New York 
that "By the terms of the plaintiff's agreement (with 
the seller) which they mad© on the faith of the defend­
ant's implied promise to indemnify, they were
entitled to perform the contract and look to the 
defendant for indemnity#" By these terms the court 
soome to be of the opinion that the buyer furnished 
the consideration for the banker's undertaking in the 
seller's favour#
In Sovereign Banlc of Canada v, Bellhouse Dillon 
& Co#^^ the banlcer revoked an irrevocable credit on the 
instruction of the buyer# The seller took an action 
against the banlc and succeeded# It was hold by the 
court that no rule of law prevents a person, furnishing 
consideration in favour of another person, from binding 
the latter with a third* The buyer can, therefore, 
furnish a consideration for the promise given by the 
banlcer to the seller#
Mead's theory resembles the offer and acceptance 
17theory * The banlcer is treated as offeror and the 
seller as offeree. The difference is that Mead sees 
the/
16# Supra 
17 # Infra
1 0 0 .
the consideration for the banlcer*s undertaking moving 
from the buyer instead of from the seller. As for the 
lawyers of the countries where the doctrine of consider­
ation is not a probleip* this theory would not be more 
adequate to explain the validity of the credit contract 
than the offer and acceptance theory* This view is 
acceptable in the light of common law principles of 
some states in America which allow a third party to 
give consideration instead of the parties to the contract 
and accordingly the buyer's promise to indemnify the 
banlcer for his undertaking would be regarded as a good 
o ons iderat ion•
Mead's theory is adequate to solve the problem of
consideration for some countries but it cannot apply
3 8generally in common law countries* In England ' the law 
requires consideration to move from the promisee to the 
promisor and accordingly the consideration given by the 
buyer for the banker's undertaking in favour of the 
seller would not be a valid one and therefore the 
contract between banker and seller would not be enforce- 
able^^.
According to this theory it can be said that the 
credit contract is dependent on the contract entered 
into/
18. See Thayer pp. 1039™40
19* See decision of Viscount Haldane L.G. in Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Go. Ltd. v. Selfridge & Go. Ltd. 
1913"*"A7cT8Ïy5*"aïso~™Gutt©ridge and Megrah pp. 24-8
lüX.
into by the buyer and the banlcer. There must be a
valid consideration for the banker's undertaking*
Failure to give consideration by the buyer would
affect the validity of the credit contract* Questions
can be asked regarding the seller's position when it
happens that some circumstances affect the credit
contract* As Ellinger pointed out; "The question,
however, arises as to what would be the position of
the seller* if, for example, the buyer became insolvent
or if his contract with the banker became frustrated*
Similarly, one cannot help wondering, if this theory
were accepted, what the seller's position would be if
the buyer induced the banker to open, the credit by
fraud* Could the bank in such cases revoke the credit
on the ground that the consideration supplied by the
20buyer had failed?" If such circumstances happen, 
the credit contract could not stand and the seller's 
right would be subject thereto* However there is not 
such a question of the seller's position under an
irrevocable credit where the credit contract is a
21separate transaction from other contracts*
In application of this theory the buyer has an 
important role to play in the credit contract* One may 
wonder/
20* See Ellinger p. 80; also McCurdy pp* 579-81; 
Thayer p* lo4o
21$ General provisions and definitions of the ü,C*P* 
for Documentary Credits (1974 Revision) supra
wonder in what capacity the buyer is acting in giving
consideration to the banlcer ' s undertaking instead of
the seller. If he be treated as the seller's agent,
this argument could not be a good answer as discussed
PPin the agency theory""'.
Mead's theory is of assistance to overcome the 
problem of consideration, in some common law countries, 
in order to explain the validity of the seller's right 
against the banker under the irrevocable credit. 
However, it could not be regarded as applicable 
generally; it leaves problems unsolved in the matter 
of compliance with the true nature of the irrevocable 
credit*
22, Supra
JLVJ) ,
An attempt to explain the banlcer-s©3.1er legal
relationship under the credit was also advanced by
Davis, contending that the relationship is in the form
of an ordinary contract and can be explained by the
offer and acceptance theory in these t©rins s
"The basis of this theory is that the ioeue by the
banker of the letter of credit is an offer which the
seller, being the person to whom it is directed, may
accepts According to some authorities, the acceptance
is constituted by the act of the seller in tendering
23the documents and a draft to the banker,"
Davis quoted a number of English and American cases 
to support this argument $
24In TJrauhart Lindsav & Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Bank Ltd* 
there was a contract of sale between Urquhart Lindsay &
Co, Ltd., the plaintiffs, and Benjamin Jute Mills, the 
buyer, under which the former undertook to manufacture 
certain machinery and deliver it f.o.b. Glasgow to 
Calcutta against payment to be made by a confirmed 
irrevocable credit. At the request of the buyers.
Eastern Bank Ltd., the defendants opened an irrevocable 
credit in the seller's favour in these terms: "We beg
to advise you that under instructions received from our 
Calcutta branch, we are prepared to pay you the amount 
of/
23. Gneo Davis p. 73
24. (1922) 1 K.B, 313
J.UH- •
of your bills on B# N* Elias, managing agent, the 
Benjamin Jute Mills Co. Ltd., Calcutta to the extent 
of but not exceeding 70,000* The bills are to be 
accompanied by the following complete documents cover­
ing shipment of the machinery to Calcutta «.. " The 
credit covered several shipments. The total amount of 
the drafts exceeded the amount mentioned in the contract 
price but did not exceed the amount provided in the 
credit. The drafts and the shipping documents were 
accepted and paid for the first two shipments* Knowing 
of the excess amount of the previous drafts the buyers 
instructed the defendants to pay only the amount in the 
sale contract. Accordingly the defendants refused to 
pay the drafts since they exceeded the amount agreed in 
the contract price. The plaintiffs treated this as 
refusal and as repudiation of the whole contract and 
brought an action for damages.
In the course of his judgment Rowlatt, J, pointed 
out the nature of the credit and the legal position of 
the parties in these terms; "There can be no doubt 
that upon the plaintiffs acting upon the undertaking 
contained in this letter of credit consideration moved 
from the plaintiffs, which bound the defendant to the 
irrevocable character of the arrangement between the 
defendants and the plaintiffs."
Similarly/
25Similarly in Dexter Ltd. v. Schenlcer & Co." it
was held by Greer J. that there was consideration for
the banlcer*s undertaking in these words; "Now it is
clear that, until they (the plaintiffs) get a form of
banlcer*s credit which would comply with the terms of
the contract, plaintiffas were not bound to send the
goods forward at all; and therefore, not having got
the banker's credit, until there xiras a substituted
arrangement for some other credit elsewhere, they wore
under no obligation to anybody to send forward the
goods. Therefore, it is quite clear that there was
full and ample consideration for this undertaking and
I am not surprised that (counsel for th© def©ndants)
withdraw the contention which appears in the pleadings-
26that there was no consideration."
This argument, showing that there is a valid
contract entered into between the banlcer and the seller,
is based on cases and is not a very recent argument.
While it is still supported by Davis, it is rejected
27
by many writers .
When/
25. (1923) l4 LI.L.Rep. p. 586
26. See also American Cases; Banco National Ultramarino 
V. First National Bank of Boston 289 F, 169*tl923)T 
American Steel Go. v* Irvinæ National Bank 266 P. 4l 
at p. 43 (1920); Second National Banlc of Hoboker v* 
Columbia Trust Co. 288 F. 1? at p."""2rilL923Ti
Moss V. Old Colony Trust Co. 246 Mass B9 l40NE 803
(1923)
27. See Finkelstein p. 279 at seq; Thayer p. 1039 5 
McCurdy pp. 566-70; Mead p. 301
U . U U  .
lintien considering the offer and acceptance theory,
the question arises as to khow what exactly constitutes
the seller's acceptance of the banker's offer. In
Urquhart Lindsay & Co. Ltd. v* Eastern Bank Ltd. Rowlatt
J« commented about the validity of the contract between
banlcer and seller that there is the seller's acceptance
by •acting upon the undertaking" stipulated in the
letter of credit, but the learned judge did not make
it clear what he meant by these terms, nor in Dexter
Ltd. V. Schenlcer was the act of acceptance pointed out 
28by Greer J. In this theory Davis says that "according
to some authorities, the acceptance is constituted by
the act of the seller in tendering the documents and the
P9draft to the banlcer. " ^ Gutteridge and Megrali disagree­
ing with the view that the credit is an offer and the 
seller's tendering’ the documents and a draft an accept­
ance say! "The objection to this suggestion appears to 
be obvious because it does not meet the situation which 
arises in the case of an irrevocable credit. If the 
credit in such a case is merely an offer there must be 
an intervening space of time (i.e. until the documents 
are tendered) during which the banker can withdraw the
offer and cancel the credit, thus defeating the very
30object for which it was issued." They are of the 
opinion/
28 ft Supra
29* Se^ e Davis p. 73
30. See Gutteridge and Megrah p. 28j and also see 
Miller p. 31
opinion that there is no other conduct of the seller 
which can constitute the seller's acceptance, accord­
ingly the problem of time-lags would arise. Davis, 
answering to this objection, said that the seller's 
conduct or behaviour toward the contract of sal© is to 
be considered as acceptance; he explained* "But such 
authority as there is on the point would seem to suggest 
that the acceptance takes place at some time anterior
to the tender of the documents, at the latest when the
31goods are shipped." Apart from the tender of documents
and the drafts there remain two other circumstances
which can be said to constitute the seller's acceptance
in the credit* Firstly, the seller's making of the
contract of sale with the buyer, stipulating that the
payment of the goods would be made by an irrevocable
credit. The contract of sale was concluded before the
issue of the credit and therefore cannot be considered
as an act of acceptance on the part of the seller.
Secondly, the seller's performance of the contract of
sale can hardly be argued to be an act of acceptance
since it is the sellerls obligation under the contract 
32of sal© • However, it was suggested that the latest 
view oould be an act of acceptance. It was said that 
even if the contract of sale is concluded bbfore the 
issuance of the credit, the buyer has under his contract 
an/
31. S-ee Davis p. 78
32, S*ee Gutteridge and Megrah pp, 24-28; McCurdy 
p. 569Î Finkelstein p, 282
108.
an obligation to provide an irrevocable credit and the
seller is under no obligation to perform bis duty before
the credit reaches him. The credit and the beginning
of the performance of the contract of sale take place
simultaneously so there can be deemed to be both the
performance of the contract of sale and the "seller's
33acting upon" the banker's offer . This does not seem 
to be a strong argument because in the ordinary trans­
action of the credit, this is not in the contemplation 
of the parties^ \
Regarding the problem of the seller's acceptance, 
one may wonder whether it can be assumed that there is 
the seller's anticipatory acceptance communicated to 
the banker before the tender of documents. E,g* the 
contract of sale providing for the payment of the goods 
to be made by an irrevocable credit could be talszen to 
imply that the seller is willing to accept the credit 
when it is arranged and issued in the terms specified, 
say an irrevocable credit with a banker of good repute. 
Alternatively, the seller's acceptance could perhaps
foe assumed by the intimation of the credit to him and
3 5the absence of any objections thereto on his part '.
The first suggestion - invoking; the contract of 
sale in order to presume the seller's acceptance of the 
credit/
33. See Ellinger p. 89
34. See Gutteridge and Megrah pp. 24-28 
35» See supra p. 4O', Delegation theory
credit would face the same objections as the previous
argument. If the contract of sale implies the seller's
acceptanceg this would not be consistent with the
independence of the credit. It is seen that the banker's
undertaking is separate from other contracts involving
36the operation of the credit *
Regarding the second suggestion - that failure to
intimate refusal and the absence of any objection to
the credit on issue can amount to acceptance* It is
kno'tm that mental acceptance is not sufficient when an
offer requires acceptance; there must be a communication
37of the assent to the offerer # However, it is said
that in some circumstances of trade dealings it may bo
held that failure to refuse an offer amounts to accept- 
38ance,^ If silence amounts to acceptance in the case of
the credit, a problem will then arise to ascertain the
time when the irrevocability comes into existence.
According to circumstances, the acceptance can be
deemed to be given as soon as the credit reaches the
39seller or after that time” •
The discussion of the offer and acceptance theory 
reveals that it is not satisfactory to treat the credit 
aa an offer to be accepted by the seller. The difficulty 
of/
r^'i C & n O C  C h Æ  ^  cze-C-et^ÉLu^cc. î f i x
36J Sit C of General Provisions and Definitions cited supra
37. See Gloag, p. 285 Walker p. 533
38, See Gloag, p. 28 supra
39 * See supra p. 4Ô, Delegation theory
of ascertaining the seller's acceptance remains to be 
solved. In Scots law the offer hold open shows an 
indication that it could perhaps overcome this problem, 
Could the of fer held open theory or a theory similar 
to this be a remedy to the difficulty?
1 1 1 .
4, The Offer-held-open and the Unilateral Voluntary 
Obligation Theories
Having examined and criticised different theories 
advanced to interpret the legal nature and consequences 
of the banker-seller relationship under the irrevocable 
credit, it is seen that not one of them has provided a 
satisfactory solution. In the last chapter, the offer 
and acceptance theory, the objection remains to ascertain 
the seller's acceptance to make the banlcer bound by his
4oundertaking. As has been indicated , however, Scots
law may afford a means of avoiding the difficulties in
the way of the offer and acceptance t h e o r y I n  that
system, an. intimated promise can constitute a unilateral
voluntary obligation enforceable in its terms by the
party in whose favour it is given. Similarly, because
of the absence of the doctrine of consideration, Scots
law permits a unilateral obligation to hold an offer 
42open , Either of those positions could be used to 
explain the irrevocable credit. In Scots law, if the 
credit is interpreted as an offer kept open by the 
banker, the latter would be bound by his undertaking 
to keep the credit open after he has communicated his 
offer/
40, See supra p , 110
4l* See Diab p. 72 and subs The Obligat o ry Offer 
T%0ory
42, Of course in Scots law a promise must contain
certain prescribed legal elements before it can 
amount to a legally enforceable pollicitatio, 
i•©, a unilateral voluntary obligation.
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offer to the seller* The latter does not have to accept 
or change his position to make that undertaking binding 
in his favour* So the banlcer is bound initially by his 
promise to keep the offer open, and subsequently by the 
acceptance of the seller of the underlying or separate 
obligation of the bank to pay* Equally, if the credit 
is treated as a unilateral voluntary obligation - a 
pollicitatio - it would be binding upon the banker as 
soon as Intimated to the seller, without any need for 
acceptance* real or constructive* It could not be uni­
laterally revoked, after that intimation, except so far 
as permitted by its terms# If given irrevocably for a 
specified period, or to a specified date, it could not 
be revoked within that time ilf&thout the agreement of the 
seller* Indeed even if the credit were treated as merely 
an offer held open, the obligation to hold it open would 
itself be pollicitatio^ so that in the end the offer- 
hold-open theory would in Scots law depend upon that 
system's device of binding unilateral obligations* If 
the credit is interpreted as a binding promise by the 
requirements of Scots law, then the presentation of the 
documents is seen to be merely a necessary terra of the 
obligation of the promisor, a condition of its enforce­
ment, but not a condition of its constitution,
In England, the law does not recognise even the 
offer held open unless it is supported by consideration 
or made under seal « Such an undertaking is revocable, 
an offer is binding when it is accepted and a simjgle 
promise/
3 %  Concerning the expiry of the credit see U.C.P, in the
Appendix - Expiry Date Art * 37
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promis© cannot hold the promissor to his undertaking. 
Concerning this point Jeunes L . 0. in Dickinson v.
Dodds observeds "It is clear settled law, on one of 
the clearest principles of law, that the promise being 
a mere nudum pactum, was not binding, and that at any
moment before a cotoplet© acceptance by Dickinson of
43the offer Dodds was as free as Dickinson himself."
Concerning this point of law Scots law contradicts 
English law. Once intimated, a promise cannot be 
revoked unless it is either refused, or expires naturally 
before being acted upon^^% According to Bell: "If a
time be limited for acceptance, the offer is held to 
subsist, and not to be revocable during that time, and 
to be withdrawn by the expiration of that time without 
ac c e p t a n c e , a n d in section 63 "Unilateral obligation 
may be either gratuitous or for valuable consideration.
It is not necessary that an obligation shall proceed 
upon a valuable consideration, adequate or inadequate.
It is effectual if an engagement be proved by such 
evidence as law requires in the special case."*^
Lord Fraser explained the offer kept open in Little John 
V. Hadwen in these terms ; "The défendant was not 
entitled to withdraw his offer before the expiry of 
the/
43C (1876) L.R. 2 Ch.Div. 463; see also Routl
V. Grant (lS28) 4 Bing* 653
44. See Gloag p. 42 and footnote no. 7î Walker vol. 1
pp. T.B. Smith pp. 742-3
45. Bell Prin. 29
46. Bell Prin. 63
1 1 4 .
the ten days; that it was an obligation no doubt uni­
lateral, but still binding upon the offer during the 
appointed period, Aocording to the law of England,
h'7such an offer as this was revocable before acceptance,**'^  
Viscount Dunedin pointed out clearly the difference 
between Scots and English law concerning this point in 
Paterson v. Highland Railway Co.^^ in these terms;
**Great stress was laid on the distinction between 
Scottish and English law in respect of the doctrine of 
consideration, I have on more than one occasion had 
to deal with this topic, and I do not think I have ever 
shoivn my desire to introduce the doctrine of consider­
ation in the law of Scotland* Nay, more, I am prepared 
to say that the opinion of Lord Ordinary Fraser,
k 9expressed in the now old case of Little John v, Hadwen 
in which I was counsel many years ago, is right, i.e, 
if/
(1882) 205 L.R« 5* It seems that such an offer
is to be regarded as a promise or unilateral 
voluntary obligation contrast the bilateral 
gratuitous contract, "where one party alone is 
bound to do something and the other is bound 
merely to accept but not to do or pay anything 
in return," Walker Prins, 521, See also Walker 
p , 529, "If an offerer undertakes to keep his 
offer open for a stated time, the undertaking is 
a separate voluntary obligation, and withdrawal 
of the offer before the stated time is an action- 
able breach of contract,"
48, cit, supra
49. {1882) 205 L,R* 5f cited supra
If I offer my property to a certain person at a certain 
price, and go on to sayi *this offer is to be open up 
to a certain date*, I cannot withdraw that offer 
before that date, if the person to whom I made the 
offer chooses to accept it* Xt would be different in 
Englahd, for the case supposed there would be no consider* 
ation for the promise to keep the offeroppen." Those 
dicta concerned the situation where offers were made 
which required acceptance if they were to become 
contracts between the parties* The maker of the offer 
does not unilaterally oblige himself to implement the 
offer, except if it is in due course accepted by the 
other party* He does, however, oblige himself to keep 
the offer open for a specified time* That obligation 
is binding, as a promise, without acceptance; it is 
not itself an offer*
The credit being interpreted in Scots law as an 
offer held open, or directly as a binding promise, such 
an interpretation is free from the difficulties Inherent 
in the only corresponding theory available in English 
law, namely the offer-held—open explanation* Such an 
interpretation depends upon a well recognised and 
settled principle in Scots law finding its legal 
foundation in precedents and authorities* It seems 
to answer this aspect of the problem concerning the 
banlcer-seller relationship under an irrevocable credit* 
Unlike many theories discussed which tend to give 
a fictitious picture to the credit, the offer-held-open 
or/
XJ.O*
and the unilateral voluntary obligation theories as thus 
translated into Scottish concept provide a more real­
istic explanation and seem to give an adequate answer 
to the nature of the relationship and its legal 
consequences «
Xn the same way that the offerer or p r o m i s o r   ^ Is 
bound by his offer or promise until the expiry of a 
fixed period of time and not being entitled to revoke 
it, the banker is bound by his issuing the credit to 
the seller until the expiry of the credit.
The banker's obligation comes from his absolute 
undertaking and is not dependent on the seller’s 
acceptance. This theory would avoid not only the 
difficulty of want of condideration, but also the
objections relating to the need for the seller’s 
50acceptance *
In this theory the banker’s undertaking is inde­
pendent and primary and hence the theory would not
conflict with the independence of the credit which has
51often been stressed . Tlie seller has a direct right 
against the banker as the result of the latter*s 
undertaking, which does not derive from other contracts 
This/
50# Silence, conduct, antecedent arrangem^t, or other 
forms of personal bar. See supra, .
51 * Section C of the General Provisions and Defin­
itions of the U,C»P* cited supra
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This seems to be the legal positioh although, xn 
business or practical terms, the issue of the credit 
must surely have been prompted by the terms of the 
contract of sal© •
52, Hamzeh Mai as v, British Iinex Industries Ltd.
’Ji957T^  Lloyd'8™B^ pl^ lRû^ riR^ %riFlirBT~r27T
{^ ee also Société Métallurgique d’Aubive & 
Villerupt v * British Bank for Poreiæn Trade 
(1922) iT Ll.L.R, 168 and also Section G of 
the General Provisions and Definitions of the 
U.C.P.I also Miller p« 27
53* See Gutteridg© and Megrah, p. 44 "Credit a
Term df Sales Contract" and "Conclusion" infra
118.
CONCLUSION
The banker’s commercial credit, a valuable
financial device, is greatly used nowadays in world
transactions# Its practical functioning does not
seem to present any complication but the study of
its legal nature has engendered problems for layyers
who endeavour to fit it into existing legal theory.
This has led to many theories, some of which tend to
modify its true operation and nature*
Tlie business purpose of the credit is clearly to
carry the contract of sal© into effect by means of at
least two further contracts, being ancillary to the
contract of sale itself* In other words the buyer and
seller enter into a contract of sale in the terms that
payment of the goods should be made by an irrevocable
credit. The buyer, as a result of this, arranges for
the credit with the banlter. The banker, following the
buyer’s instructions, issues the credit offering to
honour the seller’s drafts in accordance with the
buyer’s instruction, i.e. the terms of the credit.
In business and practical terms the issue of the credit
must have originated from the Contract of sale* This
all three parties 
seems to foe one of the reasons why theories involving/
1have been invoked to solve the problem * Not one of 
them/
1. The main problem could be the failure to make a 
distinction between old forms of credit and 
banker’s commercial credit.
them has been found to be a good answer. The banker’s 
credit has its particular feature, it stands on its 
own.
If it is intended that the banlter ’ s undertaking 
be independent or that credit be a separate trans­
action, could the credit possibly be considered of 
the nature of an offer? The difficulties which the 
courts have found in employing this theory arise from 
the need to identify an acceptance by the seller before 
the credit can be binding upon the bank and to overcome 
the apparent lack of consideration. The latter point 
has been the most troublesome problem for the dis­
cussion of the banker-seller relationship in common 
law countries.
Miller, observing difficulties arising from the 
banlcer’s commercial credit, remarked: "Ihe English
courts have not shown any marked enthusiasm for 
theorising as to the legal foundation of the relation­
ship of seller and banker under an irrevocable letter 
of credit* Such dicta as can be cited from the judg­
ments in English cases are often difficult to apply 
since they tend to seek to explain the legal principles 
so as to preserve a consistency with principles laid 
down in earlier cases dealing with out-moded types of 
credit, such as the general credit. They are also in 
difficulty in explaining any resultant contractual 
relationship without first disposing of the tortuosities 
of/
of the English law of consideration. That particular 
difficulty does not present itself in Scots law ... "
"Gutteridg© and Megrah (op. cit. pp. 17-18) 
recognise the inadequacy of most of the theories 
Q,dvanced to explain the irrevocable commercial credit 
in terms of legal principle and advocate the * realistic 
approach* that these credits are justified by their 
existence in commerce and their practical use, and that 
little purpose is served by hacking them dp to fit a 
Procrustean bed of legal theory. They approve the 
recommendation of the Law Revision Committee that the 
validity of such credits in law should be clearly 
stated,
In Scots law, however, to explain the banker- 
seller relationship under an irrevocable credit in 
terms of an offer and acceptance and hence as in the 
end a binding unilateral obligation or pollicitatio 
could be an answer to the problem and its consequences. 
It would solve objections concerning the independence 
of the credit, the seller would have a direct right 
against the banker as soon as the credit were advised 
to him and also, in the case where the banker failed 
to pay, the seller would have a right against the buyer 
for the payment of the price of the goods under the 
contract of sale.
The/
2. See Miller pp. 31—32 . -fo-r ttm r s d l t p
lU^uJLo^ O/A. rQ{/"o<xx.hl^  ^ Sfi<î -Hzcj'S ^ p  XS  stx-pvct. ,
121.
The offer-held-open aiîd.tîi© unilateral voluntary 
obligation theories are able to answer the questions 
of difficulty concerning the legal nature and the 
consequences of the banker-seller relationship under 
an irrevocable credit, as far as Scots laxf is 
concerned. However, it has far to go to be adopted 
generally, due to conflict with the laws of other 
countries and particularly with those which are 
influenced and dominated by English law, whore the 
doctrine of consideration is strongly followed.
In the modern commercial context, where English 
law faces the necessity of coming to terms with the 
European legal tradition within the European Economie 
Community, this Scottish solution to an English 
problem may perhaps be a point at which the common 
lawyer may begin to draw from the civilian heritage 
still available in the law of England’s partner in 
the United Kingdom*
et» «9 •
APPENDIX
Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits
(1974 Revision)
General Provisions and Definitions
(a) These provisions and definitions and the following 
articles apply to all documentary credits and are binding 
upon all pagrties thereto unless otherwise expressly 
agreed,
(b) For the purposes of such provisions, definitions 
and articles the expressions ’documentary credit(s)* 
and ’oredit(s)’ used therein mean any arrangement, 
however named or described, whereby a bank (the issuing 
bank) acting at the request and in accordance with the 
instructions of a customer (the applicant for the credit)
(i) is to malce payment or to the order of a third party 
(the beneficiary), or is to pay, accept or negotiate 
bills of exchange (drafts) drawn by the beneficiary, 
or
(ii) authorizes such payments to be made or such drafts 
to be paid, accepted or negotiated by another bank,
against stipulated documents, provided that the terras 
and conditions of the credit are complied with.
(c) Credits, by their nature, are separate transactions 
from the sales or other contracts on which they may be 
based and banlcs are in no way concerned with or bound 
by such contracts,
(d)/
(d) Credit instructions and the credits themselves 
must be complete and precise. In order to guard 
against confusion and misunderstanding, issuing banks 
' should discourage any attempt by the applicant for the 
credit to include excessive detail,
(©) The bank first entitled to exercise the option 
available under Article 32b shall be the bank authorized 
to pay, accept or negotiate under a credit* The decision 
of such banlc shall bind all parties concerned#
A bank is authorized to pay or accept under a 
credit by being specifically nominated in the credit*
A bank is authorised to negotiate under a credit 
either
(i) by being specifically nominated in the credit, or
(ii) by the credit being freely negotiable by any banlc*
(f) A beneficiary can in no case avail himself of the 
contractual relationships existing between banlcs or 
between the applicant for the credit and the issuing banlc
A* Form and notification of credits 
ARTICLE 1
(a) Credits may be either
(i) revocable, or
(ii) irrevocable*
(b) All credits, therefore, should clearly indicate 
whether they are revocable or irrevocable*
(c) In the absence of such indication the credit shall 
be deemed to be revocable*
ARTICLE 2/
ARTICLE 2
A revocable credit may be amended or cancelled at any 
moment without prior notice to the beneficiary. However 
the Issuing banlc is bound to reimburse a branch or Other 
bank to which such a credit has been transmitted and 
made available for payment, acceptance or negotiation, 
for any payment, acceptance or negotiation complying 
with the terms and conditions of the credit and any 
amendments received up to the time of payment, accept­
ance or negotiation made by such branch or other banlc 
prior to receipt by it of notice of amendment or of 
cancellation.
ARTICLE 3
(a) An irrevocable credit constitutes a definite under­
taking of the issuing bank, provided that the terras and 
conditions of the credit are complied with:
(1) to pay, or that payment will be made, if the
credit provides for payment whether against a 
draft or not ;
(ii) to accept drafts if the credit provides for accept" 
ance by the issuing bank or to be responsible for 
their acceptance and payment at maturity if the 
credit provides for the acceptance of drafts
drawn on the applicant for the credit or any
other drawee specified in the credit ;
(ill) to purchase/negotiate, without recourse to drawers 
and/or bona fide holders, drafts drawn by the 
beneficiary, at sight or at a tenor, on the 
applicant/
applicant for the credit or on any other drawee 
specified in the credit, or to provide for 
purchase/negotiation by another banlc, if the 
credit provides for purchase/negotiation,
(b) Ahnirrevocable credit may be advised to a bene­
ficiary through another bank (the advising bank) 
without engagement on the part of that bank, but when 
an issuing bank authorizes or requests another banlc to 
confirm its irrevocable credit and the latter does so, 
such confirmation constitutes a definite undertaking 
of the confirming banlc in addition to the undertaking 
of the Issuing bank, provided that the terms and 
conditions of the credit are complied with:
(i) to pay, if the credit is payable at its own 
counters, whether against a draft or not, or that pay­
ment will be made if the credit provides for payment 
elsewhere|
(ii) to accept drafts if the credit provides for 
acceptance by the confirming banlc, at its own counters, 
or to be responsible for their acceptance and payment 
at maturity if the credit provides for the acceptance 
of drafts drawn on the applicant for the credit or any 
other drawee specified in the credit ;
(iii) to purchase/negotiate, without recourse to drawers 
and/or bona fide holders, drafts drawn by the bene­
ficiary, at sight or at a tenor, on the issuing bank,
or on the applicant for the credit or on any other 
drawee specified in the credit, if the credit provides 
for purchase/negotiation*
(o) /
x«cu *
(c) Such undertakings can neitliei^ be amended nor 
cancelled without the agreement of all parties 
thereto* Partial acceptance of amendments is not 
effective without the agreement of all parties thereto* 
ARTICLE 4
(a) When an issuing bank instructs a banlc by cable, 
telegram or telex to advise a credit, and intends the 
mail confirmation to be the operative credit instrument, 
the cable, telegram or telex must state that the credit 
will only be effective on receipt of such mail con­
firmation* In this event, the issuing bank must send 
the operative credit instrument (mail confirmation)
and any subsequent amendments to the credit to the 
beneficiary through the advising banlc*
(b) The issuing banlc will be responsible for any 
consequences arising from its failure to follow the 
procedure set out in the preceding paragraph*
(c) Unless a cable, telegram or telex states ’details 
to follow’ (or words of similar effect), or states 
that the mail confirmation is to be the operative 
credit instrument, the cable, telegram or telex will 
be deemed to be the operative credit Instrument and 
the issuing bank need not send the mail confirmation 
to the advising banlc*
ARTICLE 5/
XA, t #
ARTICLE 3
IVhen a bank is instructed by cable, telegram or telex 
to issue, confirm or advise a credit similar in terms 
to one previously established and which has been the 
subject of amendments, it shall be understood that 
the details of the credit being issued, confirmed or 
advised will be transmitted to the beneficiary excluding 
the amendments, unless the instructions specify 
clearly any amendments which are to apply*
article 6
If incomplete or unclear instructions are received to 
issue, confirm or advise a credit, the bank requested 
to act on such instructions may give preliminary 
notification of the credit to the beneficiary for 
information only and without responsibility| in this 
event the credit will be issued, confirmed or advised 
only when the necessary information has been received.
B* Liabilities and responsibilities
* *  «I»  «M W» * • > »  * > • # * • * « « ■ « » » •  «M «W *M  »I> W« W  « *  «S»—  — W» «#•
ARTICLE 7
Banlcs must examine all documents with reasonable care 
to ascertain that they appear o n their face to be in 
accordance with the terras and conditions of the 
credit. Documents which appear on their face to be 
inconsistent with one another will foe considered as 
not appearing on their face to be in accordance with 
the terme and conditions of the credit*
ARTICLE 8/
ARTICLE 8
(a) In documentary credit operations all parties 
concerned deal in documents and not in goods.
(b) Payment, acceptance or negotiation against docu­
ments which appear on their face to be in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of a credit by a bank 
authorized to do so, binds the party giving the 
authorization to talc© up the documents and reimburse 
the banlc which has effected the payment, acceptance 
or negotiation.
(c) If, upon receipt of the documents, the issuing 
bank considers that they appear on their face not to 
be in accordance with the terras and conditions of the 
credit, that banlc must determine, on the basis of the 
documents alone, whether to claim that payment, accept­
ance or negotiation was not effected in accordance 
with the terras and conditions of the credit,
(d) The issuing banlc shall have a reasonable time to 
examine the documents and to determine as above whetheit 
to make such a claim,
(o) If such claim is to be made, notice to that effect 
stating the reasons therefor, must, without delay, be 
given by cable or other expeditious means to the banlc 
from which the documents have been received (the 
remitting bank) and such notice must state that the 
documents are being held at the disposal of such banlc 
or are being returned thereto.
(f)/
JL^y  e
(f) If the issuing banlc fails to hold the documents 
at the disposal of the remitting bank, or fails to 
return the documente to such banlc, the issuing bank 
shall be precluded from claiming that the relative 
payment, acceptance or negotiation was not effected 
in accordance with the terras and conditions of the 
credit,
(g) If the remitting bank draws the attention of the
issuing bank to any irregularities in the documents or 
advisee such banlc that it has paid, accepted or negoti­
ated under reserve or against a guarantee in respect 
of such irregularities, the issuing bank shall not 
thereby be relieved from any of its obligations under 
this article* Such guarantee or reserve concerns only 
the relations between the remitting bank and the 
beneficiary.
ARTICLE 9
Banks assume no liability or responsibility for the 
form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification 
or legal effect of any documents, or for the general 
and/or particular conditions stipulated in the documents 
or superimposed thereon; nor do they assume any liability 
or responsibility for the description, quantity, weight, 
quality, condition, packing, delivery, value or exist­
ence of the goods represented thereby, or for the good 
faith or acts and/or omissions, solvency, performance 
or standing of the consignor, the carriers or the 
insurers of the goods or any other person whomsoever* 
ARTICLE 10/
XJKJm
ARTICLE 10
Batiks assume no liability or responsibility for the 
consequences arising out of delay and/or loss in 
transit of any messages, letters or documents, or 
for delay, mutilation or other errors arising in the 
transmission of cables, telegrams or telex. Banlcs 
assume no liability or responsibility for errors in 
translation or interpretation of technical terms, and 
reserve the right to transmit credit term© without 
translating them.
ARTICLE 11
Banlcs assume no liability or responsibility for con­
sequences arising out of the interruption of their 
business by Acts of God, riots, civil commotions, 
insurrections, wars or any other causes beyond their 
control or by any strikes or lockouts. Unless 
specifically authorized, banlcs will not effect pay­
ment, acceptance or negotiation after expiration under 
credits expiring during such interruption of business. 
ARTICLE 12
(a) Banks utilizing the services of another bank for 
the purpose of giving effect to the instructions of 
the applicant for the credit do so for the account and 
at the risk of the latter.
(b) Banks assume no liability or responsibility should 
the instructions they transmit not be carried out, even 
if they have themselves taken the initiative in the 
choice of such other bank.
(«)/
(o) The applicant for the credit shall be bound by 
and liable to indemnify the banlcs against all obli­
gations and responsibilities imposed by foreign laws 
and usages*
ARTICLE 13
A paying or negotiating bank which has been authorized 
to claim reimbursement from a third bank nominated by 
the issuing bank and which has effected such payment 
or negotiation shall not be required to oohfirm to the 
third banlc that it has done so in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of the credit*
C* Documents 
ARTICLE 14
(a) All instructions to issue, confirm or advise a 
credit muét state precisely the documents against 
which payment, acceptance or negotiation is to be made* 
(fo) Terms such as ’first class’, ’well known*, 
’qualified’ and the like shall not be used to describe 
the issuers of any documents called for under credits 
and if they are incorporated in the credit terms banlcs 
will accept documents as tendered*
G • 1 «r dlapatch or
talcing in charge ( shipping documents )
ARTICLE 15
Except as stated in Article 20, the date of the Bill 
ofxLndihgÿ or the date of any other document evidencing 
shipment or dispatch or talcing in charge, or the date 
indicated/
1 3 2 .
indicated in tlx© reception stamp or by notation on 
any such document, will be taken in each case to be 
the date of shipment or dispatch or taking in charge 
of the goods.
ARTICLE 16
(a) If words clearly indicating payment or prepayment 
of freight, however named or described^ appear by stamp 
or otherwise on documents evidencing shipment or dis­
patch or taking in charge they will be accepted as 
constituting evidence of payment of freight*
(b) If the words ’freight pro-payable* or * freight to 
be prepaid* or words of similar effect appear by stamp 
or otherwise on such documents they will not be accepted 
as constituting evidence of the payment of freight.
(o) Unless otherwise specified in the credit or in­
consistent with any of the documents; presented under 
the credit, banks will accept documents stating that 
freight or transportation charges are payable on delivery
(d) Banlcs will focept shipping documents bearing 
reference by stamp or otherwise to costs additional to 
the freight charges, such as costs of, or disbursements 
incurred in connection wit|x, loading, unloading or 
similar operations, unless the conditions of the credit 
specifically prohibit such reference*
ARTICLE 17
Shipping documents which bear a clause on the face 
thereof such as ’shipper’s load and count* or ’said by 
shipper/
shipper to contain* or words of similar effect, will 
be accepted unless otherwise specified in the credit. 
ARTICLE 18
(a) A clean shipping document is one which bears no 
superimposed clause or notation which expressly declares 
a defective condition of the goods and/or the packaging*
(b) Banks will refuse shipping documents bearing such 
clauses or notations unless the credit expressly states 
the clauses or notations which may be accepted*
0*1*1 Marine Bills of Lading 
ARTICLE 19
(a) Unless specifically authorized in the credit, Bills 
of Lading of the following nature will be rejected:
(i) Bills of Lading issued by forwarding agents*
(ii) Bills of Lading which are issued under and are
subject to the conditions of a Charter-Party*
(iii) Bills of Lading covering shipment by sailing 
vessels *
(b) However, subject to the above and unless otherwise 
specified in the credit, Bills of Lading of the 
following nature will be accepteds
(i) ’Through* Bill© of Lading issued by shipping
companies or their agents even though they cover
several modes of transport*
(ii) Short Form Bills of Lading (i*e# Bills of Lading 
issued by shipping companies or their agents which 
indicate some or all of the conditions of carriage 
by reference to a source or document other than 
the bill of Lading)*
(iii)/
(iii) Bills of Lading issued by shipping companies or 
their agents covering unitized cargoes, such as 
those on pallets ox’ in Containers#
ARTICLE 20
(a) Unless otherwise specified in the credit, Bills 
of Lading must show that the goods are loaded on board 
a named vessel or shipped on a named vessel#
(b) Loading on board a named vessel or shipment on a 
named vessèl may be evidenced either by a Bill of Lading 
bearing wording indicating loading on board a named 
vessel or shipment on a named vessel, or by means of a 
notation to that effect on the Bill of Lading signed or 
initialled and dated by the carrier or his agent, and 
the date of this notation shall be regarded as the date 
of loading on board the named vessel or shipment on the 
named vessel#
ARTICLE 21
(a) U n le s s transhipment la prohibited by the terms of 
the credit, Bills of Lading will be accepted which 
indicate that the goods will be transhipped on route, 
provided the entire voyage is covered by one and the 
same Bill of Lading*
(b) Bills of Lading incorporating printed clauses 
stating that the carriers have the right to tranship 
will foe accepted notwithstanding the fact that the 
credit prohibits transhipment.
ARTICLE 2 2 /
ARTICLE 22
(a) Banlcs will refuse a Bill of Lading stating that 
the goods are loaded on deck, unless specifically 
authorised in the credit.
(b) Banlcs will not refuse a Bill of Lading which 
contains a provision that the goods may be carried on 
deck, provided it does not specifically state that 
they are loaded on deck*
C*l*2 Combined Transport Documents 
ARTICLE 23
(a) If the credit calls for a combined transport 
document, i*e# one which provides for a combined 
transport by at least two different modes of transport, 
from a place at which the goods are taken in charge to 
a place designated for delivery, or if the credit 
provides for a combined transport, but in either case 
does not specify the form of documents required and/or 
the issuer of such document, banks will accept such 
documents as tendered*
(b) If the combined transport includes transport by 
sea the document will be accepted although it does not 
indicate that the goods are on board a named vessel, 
and although it contains a provision that the goods, if 
packed in a Container, may be carried on deck, provided 
it does not specifically state that they are loaded on 
deck*
C.1.3/
G*l*3 Other Shipping Documents, etc.
ARTICLE 2 k
Banks will consider a Railway or Inland Waterway Bill 
of Lading or Consignment Note, Counterfoil Waybill, 
Postal Receipt, Certificate of Mailing, Air Mail 
Receipt, Air Waybill, Air Consignment Note or Air 
Receipt, Trucking Company Bill of Lading or any other 
similar document as regular when such document bears 
the reception stamp of the carrier or his agent, or 
when it bears a signature purporting to be that of the 
carrier or his agent*
ARTICLE 25
Where a credit calls for an attestation or certification 
of weight in the case of transport other than by sea, 
bq.nlce will accept a weight stamp or declaration of 
wéight superimposed by the carrier on the shipping 
document unless the credit calls for a separate or 
independent certificate of weight*
C *2 Insurance Documents 
ARTICLE 26
(a) Insurance documents must be as specified in the 
credit, and must be issued and/or signed by insurance 
companies or their agents or by underwriters*
(b) Cbver notes issued by brokers will not be accepted, 
unless specifically authorized in the credit*
ASTIOLE 27/
ARTICLE 27
Unless otherwise specified in the credit, or unless 
the insurance documents presented establish that the 
cover is effective at the latest from the date of ship­
ment or dispatch or, in the case of combined transport, 
the date of talcing the goods in charge, banlcs will 
refuse insurance documents presented which bear a date 
later than the date of shipment or dispatch or, in the 
case of combined transport, the date of talcing the goods 
in charge, as evidenced by the shipping documents.
ARTICLE 28
(a) Unless otherwise specified in the credit, the 
insurance document must be expressed in the same 
currency as the credit#
(b) The minimum amount for which insurance must be 
effected is the OIF value of the goods concerned* However 
when the GIF value of the goods cannot be determined
from the documents on their face, banlcs will accept as 
such minimum amount the amount of the drawing under the 
credit or the amount of the relative commercial invoice, 
whichever is the greater#
ARTICLE 29
(a) Credits should expressly state the type of insurance 
required and, if any, the additional risks which are to 
be covered. Imprecise terms such as ’usual risks’ or 
•customary risks’ should not be used: howëver, if such 
imprecise terms are used, banlcs will accept insurance 
documents as tendered.
(b)/
x:jo  #
(fo) Failing specific instructions, banks will accept 
insurance cover as tendered#
ARTICLE 30
Where a credit stipulates •insurance against all risks’, 
banks will accept an insurance document which contains 
any *all risks* notation or clause, and will assume no 
responsibility if any particular risk is not covered, 
ARTICLE 31
Banlcs will accept an insurance document which indicates 
that the cover is subject tb a franchise or an excess 
(deductible), unless it is specifically stated in the 
credit that the Insurance must be issued irrespective 
of percentage#
G * 3 Commercial Invoices 
ARTICLE 32
(a) Unless otherwise specified in the credit, commercial 
invoices must be made out in the name of the applicant 
for the credit#
(b ) Unless otherwise specified in the credit, banlcs 
may refuse commercial invoices issued for amounts in 
excess of the amount permitted by the credit#
(o) The description of the goods in the commercial 
invoice must correspond with the description in the 
credit• In all other documents the goods may be 
described in general terras not inconsistent with the 
description of the goods in the credit•
0.4/
G#4 other Documenta 
ARTICLE 33
When other documents are required, such as Warehouse 
Receipts, Delivery Orders, Consular Invoices, Certi­
ficates of Origin, of Weight, of Quality or of Analysis 
etc# and when no further definition is given, banlcs 
will accept such documents as tendered#
D, Miscellaneous provisions
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ARTICLE 34
(a) The words * about*, •circa* or similar expressions 
used in connection with the amount of the credit or the 
quantity or the unit price of the goods are to be 
construed as allowing a difference not to exceed 10^ 
more or 10^ less#
(fo) Unless a credit stipulates that the quantity of
the goods specified must not foe exceeded or reduced a 
tolerance of yfo more or 3^ less will be permissible, 
always provided that the total amount of the drawings 
does not exceed the amount of the credit# This 
tolerance does not apply when the credit specified 
quantity in terms of a stated number of packing units 
or individual items #
Partial Shipments 
ARTICLE 35
(a) Partial shipments are allowed, unless the credit 
specifically states otherwise#
(b)/
(b) Shipments made on the same ship and for the same 
voyage* even if the Bills of Lading evidencing shipment 
*on board* bear different dates and/or indicate differ­
ent ports of shipment, will not be regarded as partial 
shipments #
ARTICLE 36
If shipment by instalments within given periods is 
stipulated and any instalment is not shipped within 
the period allowed for that instalment, the credit 
ceases to be available for that or any subsequent 
instalments, unless otherwise specified in the credit. 
Exnir* Date 
ARTICLE 37
All credits* whether revocable or irrevocable must 
stipulate an expiry date for presentation of documents 
for payment* acceptance or negotiation* notwithstanding 
the stipulation of a latest date for shipment#
ARTICLE 38
The words *to*, *till% and words of similar import 
applying to the stipulated expiry date for presentation 
of documents for payMent, acceptance or negotiation* or 
to the stipulated latest date for shipment, will be 
understood to include the date mentioned#
ARTICLE 39
(a) Tifhen the stipulated expiry date falls on a day
on which banks are closed for reasons other than those 
mentioned in Article 11, the expiry date will be extended 
until the first following business day#
(b)/
JLH X •
(b) Tile latest date for shipment shall not be extended 
by reason of the extension of the expiry date in accord­
ance with this Article# Mhere the credit stipulates a 
latest date for shipment* shipping documents dated 
later than such stipulated date will not be accepted#
If no latest date for shipment is stipulated in the 
credit, shipping documents dated later than the expiry 
date stipulated in the credit or amendments thereto 
will not be accepted# Documents other than the 
shipping documents may, however, be dated up to and 
including the extended expiry date#
(c) Banks paying, accepting or negotiating on such
extended expirydhte must add to the documents their
certification in the following wording:
’Presented for payment (or acceptance or negotiation 
as the case may be) within the expiry date extended
in accordance with Article 39 of the Uniform
Customs* «
ARTICLE 40
(a) Unless the terms of the credit indicate otherwise, 
the words ’departure*, ’dispatch’, ’loading* or 
’sailing* used in stipulating the latest date for 
shipment of the goods will foe understood to be synony­
mous with ’shipment*.
(b)/
(b) Expressions such as 'prompt** 'immediately*, 'as 
soon as possible* and the like should not be used*
If they are used, banks will interpret them as a 
request for shipment within thirty days from the date 
on the advice of the credit to the beneficiary by the 
issuing bank or by an. advising bank, as the case may be*
(c) The expression *on or about* and similar expressions 
will be interpreted as a request for shipment during
the period from five days before to five days after 
the specified date, both end days included*
PresentationIcwjesasmscsfliussteHa
ARTICLE 4l
Notwithstanding the requirement of Article 37 that 
every credit must stipulate an expiry date for present­
ation of documents, credits must also stipulate a 
specified period of time after the date of issuance 
of the Bills of Lading or other shipping documents 
during which presentation of documents for payment, 
acceptance or negotiation must be made# If no such 
period of time is stipulated in the credit, banks will 
refuse documents presented to them later than 21 days 
after the date of issuance of the Bills of Lading or 
other shipping documents.
ARTICLE 42
Banlcs are under no obligation to accept presentation 
of documents outside their banking hours*
Date Terms/
143.
Date Terms
ARTICLE 43
Tiie terms ’first half, 'second half or a month shall 
foe construed respectively as from the 1st to the 15th, 
and the l6th to the last day of each month, inclusive# 
ARTICLE 44
The terms ’beginning’, ’middle* or ’end* of a month 
shall be construed respectively as from the 1st to the 
10th, the 11th to the 20th, and the 21st to the last 
day of each month, inclusive#
ARTICLE 45
When a bank issuing a credit instructs that the credit 
be confirmed or advised as available ’for one month*,
’for six months * or the like, but does not specify the 
date from which the time is to run, the confirming or 
advising bank will confirm or advise the credit as 
expiring at the end of such indicated period from the 
date of its confirmation or advice#
E. Transfer 
ARTICLE 46
(a) A transferable credit is a credit under which the 
beneficiary has the right to give instructions to the 
bank called upon to effect payment or acceptance or to 
a n y bank entitled to effect negotiation to make the 
credit available in whole or in part to one or more 
third parties (second beneficiaries)•
(b)/
144.
(b) Til© bank requested to effect the transfer, whether 
it has confirmed the credit or not, shall be under no 
obligation to effect such transfer except to the extent 
and in the manner expressly consented to by such banli, 
and until such bank's charges in respect of transfer 
are paid*
(c) Bank charges in respect of transfers are payable 
by the first beneficiary unless otherwise specified*
(d) A credit can be transferred only if it is expressly 
designated as 'transferable* by the issuing banlc*
Terms such as 'divisible', 'fractionnable*, 'assignable*, 
and 'transmissible* add nothing to the meaning of the 
term 'transferable* and shall not be used.
(e) A transferable credit can be transferred once only. 
Fractions of a transferable credit (not exceeding in the 
aggregate the amount of the credit) can be transferred 
separately, provided partial shipments are not prohibited, 
and the aggregate of such transfer® will be considered
as constituting only one transfer of the credit. The 
credit can be transferred only on the terms and con­
ditions specified in the original credit, with the 
exception of the amount of the credit, of any unit 
prices stated therein, and of the period of validity 
or period for shipment, any or all of which may be 
reduced or curtailed.
Additionally, the name of the first beneficiary 
can be substituted for that of the applicant for the 
credit/
credit, but if the name of the applicant for the credit
is specifically required by the original credit to 
appear in any document other than the invoice, such 
requirement must be fulfilled.
(f) The first beneficiary has the right to substitute 
his own invoices for those of the second beneficiary, 
for amounts not in excess of the original amount 
stipulated in the credit and for the original unit 
prides if stipulated in the credit, and upon such 
substitution of invoices the first beneficiary can draw 
under the credit for the difference, if any, between 
his invoices and the second beneficiary * s invoices•
When a credit has been transferred and the first bene­
ficiary is to supply his own invoices in exchange for 
the second beneficiary * s invoices but fails to do so
on first demand, the paying, accepting or negotiating 
bank has the right to deliver to the issuing bank the 
documents received under the credit, including the 
second beneficiary's invoices, without further 
responsibility to the first beneficiary#
(g) The first beneficiary of a transferable credit 
can transfer the credit to a second beneficiary in the 
same country or in another country unless the credit 
specifically states otherwise* The first beneficiary 
shall have the right to request that payment or 
negotiation be effected to the second beneficiary at 
the place to which the credit has been transferred, up 
to/
1 4 0
to and including the expiry date of the original credit, 
and without prejudice to the first beneficiary's right 
subsequently to substitute his own invoices for those 
of the second beneficiary and to claim any difference 
due to him*
ARTICLE 4?
The fact that a credit is not stated to be transferable 
shall not affect the beneficiary's rights to assign 
the proceeds of such credit in accordance with the 
provisions of the applicable law.
